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COWPEA (Candidates Optimally Weighted in Proportional Election using Approval voting)

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  • Toby Pereira

Abstract

This paper describes a new method of proportional representation that uses approval voting, known as COWPEA (Candidates Optimally Weighted in Proportional Election using Approval voting). COWPEA optimally elects an unlimited number of candidates with potentially different weights to a body, rather than giving a fixed number equal weight. A version that elects a fixed a number of candidates with equal weight does exist, but it is non-deterministic, and is known as COWPEA Lottery. This methods passes the "Holy Grail" criteria of monotonicity, Independence of Irrelevant Ballots, and Independence of Universally Approved Candidates. There are also ways to convert COWPEA and COWPEA Lottery to score or graded voting methods.

Suggested Citation

  • Toby Pereira, 2023. "COWPEA (Candidates Optimally Weighted in Proportional Election using Approval voting)," Papers 2305.08857, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.08857
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Monroe, Burt L., 1995. "Fully Proportional Representation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 925-940, December.
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