Cournot duopoly games with isoelastic demands and diseconomies of scale
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2022-04-04 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2022-04-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2022-04-04 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-ORE-2022-04-04 (Operations Research)
- NEP-REG-2022-04-04 (Regulation)
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