Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions
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- Andreas A. Haupt & Phillip J. K. Christoffersen & Mehul Damani & Dylan Hadfield-Menell, 2022. "Formal Contracts Mitigate Social Dilemmas in Multi-Agent RL," Papers 2208.10469, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2022-03-07 (Economic Design)
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