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Competitive equilibrium always exists for combinatorial auctions with graphical pricing schemes

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  • Marie-Charlotte Brandenburg
  • Christian Haase
  • Ngoc Mai Tran

Abstract

We show that a competitive equilibrium always exists in combinatorial auctions with anonymous graphical valuations and pricing, using discrete geometry. This is an intuitive and easy-to-construct class of valuations that can model both complementarity and substitutes, and to our knowledge, it is the first class besides gross substitutes that have guaranteed competitive equilibrium. We prove through counter-examples that our result is tight, and we give explicit algorithms for constructive competitive pricing vectors. We also give extensions to multi-unit combinatorial auctions (also known as product-mix auctions). Combined with theorems on graphical valuations and pricing equilibrium of Candogan, Ozdagar and Parrilo, our results indicate that quadratic pricing is a highly practical method to run combinatorial auctions.

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  • Marie-Charlotte Brandenburg & Christian Haase & Ngoc Mai Tran, 2021. "Competitive equilibrium always exists for combinatorial auctions with graphical pricing schemes," Papers 2107.08813, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2107.08813
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ozan Candogan & Asuman Ozdaglar & Pablo A. Parrilo, 2015. "Iterative Auction Design for Tree Valuations," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 751-771, August.
    2. Danilov, Vladimir & Koshevoy, Gleb & Murota, Kazuo, 2001. "Discrete convexity and equilibria in economies with indivisible goods and money," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 251-273, May.
    3. Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer, 2019. "Understanding Preferences: “Demand Types”, and the Existence of Equilibrium With Indivisibilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(3), pages 867-932, May.
    4. Paes Leme, Renato, 2017. "Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 294-316.
    5. Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
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