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Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News

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  • Jetlir Duraj
  • Kevin He

Abstract

A Bayesian agent experiences gain-loss utility each period over changes in belief about future consumption ("news utility"), with diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news. Diminishing sensitivity induces a preference over news skewness: gradual bad news, one-shot good news is worse than one-shot resolution, which is in turn worse than gradual good news, one-shot bad news. So, the agent's preference between gradual information and one-shot resolution can depend on his consumption ranking of different states. In a dynamic cheap-talk framework where a benevolent sender communicates the state over multiple periods, the babbling equilibrium is essentially unique without loss aversion. More loss-averse agents may enjoy higher news utility in equilibrium, contrary to the commitment case. We characterize the family of gradual good news equilibria that exist with high enough loss aversion, and find the sender conveys progressively larger pieces of good news. We discuss applications to media competition and game shows.

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  • Jetlir Duraj & Kevin He, 2019. "Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News," Papers 1908.00084, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1908.00084
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    References listed on IDEAS

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