Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk averse agent and principal
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2018-07-16 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2018-07-16 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2018-07-16 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2018-07-16 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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