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On optimal sharing rules in discrete-and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility

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  • Schattler, Heinz
  • Sung, Jaeyoung

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  • Schattler, Heinz & Sung, Jaeyoung, 1997. "On optimal sharing rules in discrete-and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 551-574.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:21:y:1997:i:2-3:p:551-574
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    2. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    4. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    5. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
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