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The Poker-Litigation Game

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  • Enrique Guerra-Pujol

Abstract

Is litigation a serious search for truth or simply a game of skill or luck? Although the process of litigation has been modeled as a Prisoner's Dilemma, as a War of Attrition, as a Game of Chicken and even as a simple coin toss, no one has formally modeled litigation as a game of poker. This paper is the first to do so. We present a simple "poker-litigation game" and find the optimal strategy for playing this game.

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  • Enrique Guerra-Pujol, 2015. "The Poker-Litigation Game," Papers 1509.01214, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1509.01214
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith, 1982. "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1123-1142, September.
    2. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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