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Note on tax enforcement and transfer pricing manipulation

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  • Alex Augusto Timm Rathke

Abstract

This note proposes the segregation of independent endogenous and exogenous components of tax penalty probability to introduce a formal demonstration that enforcement and tax penalties are negatively related with income shifting. JEL F23; H26.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Augusto Timm Rathke, 2015. "Note on tax enforcement and transfer pricing manipulation," Papers 1506.08743, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1506.08743
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1506.08743
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Theresa Lohse & Nadine Riedel, 2013. "Do Transfer Pricing Laws Limit International Income Shifting? Evidence from European Multinationals," CESifo Working Paper Series 4404, CESifo.
    2. AMERIGHI, Oscar, 2004. "Transfer pricing and enforcement policy in oligopolistic markets," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Koichi Yoshimine & Stefan Norrbin, 2007. "The effect of the corporate tax rate on the trade balance," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(5), pages 343-347.
    4. James Alm, 2012. "Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments, and field studies," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(1), pages 54-77, February.
    5. Christof Beuselinck & Marc Deloof & Ann Vanstraelen, 2014. "Cross-jurisdictional income shifting and tax enforcement: evidence from public versus private multinationals," Post-Print hal-01563059, HAL.
    6. Kant, Chander, 1990. "Multinational firms and government revenues," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 135-147, July.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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