A Global Game with Heterogenous Priors
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Cited by:
- Dominik Grafenhofer & Wolgang Kuhle, 2014. "Observing Each Other's Observations in the Electronic Mail Game," Papers 1501.00882, arXiv.org.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-01-10 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-01-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-01-10 (Microeconomics)
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