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Any Regulation of Risk Increases Risk

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  • Philip Z. Maymin
  • Zakhar G. Maymin

Abstract

We show that any objective risk measurement algorithm mandated by central banks for regulated financial entities will result in more risk being taken on by those financial entities than would otherwise be the case. Furthermore, the risks taken on by the regulated financial entities are far more systemically concentrated than they would have been otherwise, making the entire financial system more fragile. This result leaves three directions for the future of financial regulation: continue regulating by enforcing risk measurement algorithms at the cost of occasional severe crises, regulate more severely and subjectively by fully nationalizing all financial entities, or abolish all central banking regulations including deposit insurance to let risk be determined by the entities themselves and, ultimately, by their depositors through voluntary market transactions rather than by the taxpayers through enforced government participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Z. Maymin & Zakhar G. Maymin, 2010. "Any Regulation of Risk Increases Risk," Papers 1004.1670, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1004.1670
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Calem, Paul & Rob, Rafael, 1999. "The Impact of Capital-Based Regulation on Bank Risk-Taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 317-352, October.
    2. Kaplanski, Guy & Levy, Haim, 2007. "Basel's value-at-risk capital requirement regulation: An efficiency analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1887-1906, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philip Z. MAYMIN, 2018. "The Conventional Past, Behavioral Present, and Algorithmic Future of Risk and Finance," Finante - provocarile viitorului (Finance - Challenges of the Future), University of Craiova, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 1(20), pages 74-84, November.
    2. Stan Miles, 2013. "Constant-collateral pyramiding trading strategies in futures markets," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 27(4), pages 381-396, December.

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