Is Collusion-proof Procurement Expensive?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Gaurab Aryal & Maria F. Gabrielli, 2015. "Is Collusion-Proof Procurement Expensive?," Papers 1508.05353, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
References listed on IDEAS
- Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
- Aryal, Gaurab & Gabrielli, Maria F., 2013.
"Testing for collusion in asymmetric first-price auctions,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 26-35.
- Gaurab Aryal & Maria F. Gabrielli, 2011. "Testing for Collusion in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-564, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011.
"Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, "undated". "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-012, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2008. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," NBER Working Papers 14590, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gaurab Aryal & Maria F. Gabrielli & Quang Vuong, 2021.
"Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auction Models,"
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(2), pages 373-385, March.
- Aryal, Gaurab & Gabrielli, Maria F. & Vuong, Quang, 2014. "Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auction Models," MPRA Paper 57340, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gaurab Aryal & Maria Florencia Gabrielli & Quang Vuong, 2014. "Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auction Models," Papers 1407.7140, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2015.
- Feinstein, Jonathan S & Block, Michael K & Nold, Frederick C, 1985. "Asymmetric Information and Collusive Behavior in Auction Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 441-460, June.
- Elodie Guerre & I. Perrigne & Q.H. Vuong, 2000. "Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions [[Estimation nonparamétrique optimale des enchères au premier prix]]," Post-Print hal-02697497, HAL.
- Jerry Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1979. "On Coalition Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 243-254.
- Alberto Abadie & Guido W. Imbens, 2006. "Large Sample Properties of Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 235-267, January.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011.
"Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, "undated". "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-012, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2008. "Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," NBER Working Papers 14590, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gabrielli, M. Florencia & Willington, Manuel, 2023. "Estimating damages from bidding rings in first-price auctions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
- Huang, Yangguang, 2019. "An empirical study of scoring auctions and quality manipulation corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
- Matthew Gentry & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu, 2015.
"Identification and estimation in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry,"
CeMMAP working papers
CWP16/15, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Matthew Gentry & Tong Li & Jingfeng Lu, 2015. "Identification and estimation in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry," CeMMAP working papers 16/15, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Jun Ma & Vadim Marmer & Artyom Shneyerov & Pai Xu, 2021.
"Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions,"
Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(10), pages 944-982, November.
- Jun Ma & Vadim Marmer & Artyom Shneyerov & Pai Xu, 2019. "Monotonicity-Constrained Nonparametric Estimation and Inference for First-Price Auctions," Papers 1909.12974, arXiv.org.
- Lamy, Laurent, 2012.
"The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
- Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Post-Print halshs-00754606, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754606, HAL.
- Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
- Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2023.
"Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(2), pages 815-851.
- Daniel Garrett & Andrey Ordin & James W. Roberts & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2017. "Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds," NBER Working Papers 23473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hickman Brent R. & Hubbard Timothy P. & Sağlam Yiğit, 2012. "Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Econometric Methods, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 67-106, August.
- Giovanni Compiani & Philip Haile & Marcelo Sant’Anna, 2020.
"Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in US Offshore Oil Lease Auctions,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(10), pages 3872-3912.
- Giovanni Compiani & Philip Haile & Marcelo Sant'Anna, 2018. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auction," NBER Working Papers 24795, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Giovanni Compiani & Phil Haile & Marcelo Sant'Anna, 2018. "Common values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous entry in U.S. offshore oil lease auctions," CeMMAP working papers CWP37/18, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Giovanni Compiani & Philip A. Haile & Marcelo Sant'Anna, 2018. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2137R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2019.
- Giovanni Compiani & Philip A. Haile & Marcelo Sant'Anna, 2018. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2137, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Sabrina Peng, 2020. "Selective Entry in Highway Procurement Auctions," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 48(4), pages 519-533, December.
- Krasnokutskaya, Elena & Song, Kyungchul & Tang, Xun, 2022. "Estimating unobserved individual heterogeneity using pairwise comparisons," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 477-497.
- Rafael Lalive & Armin Schmutzler, 2011.
"Auctions vs negotiations in public procurement: which works better?,"
ECON - Working Papers
023, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Rafael Lalive & Armin Schmutzler & Christine Zulehner, 2015. "Auctions vs negotiations in public procurement: which Works better?," ECON - Working Papers 209, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Lalive, Rafael & Schmutzler, Armin, 2011. "Auctions vs Negotiations in Public Procurement: Which Works Better?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8538, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022.
"Competition under Incomplete Contracts and the Design of Procurement Policies,"
Working Papers
1327, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022. "Competition under incomplete contracts and the design of procurement policies," Economics Working Papers 1824, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2013.
"What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 176(1), pages 46-58.
- Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2007. "What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach," Microeconomics.ca working papers marmer-07-11-22-02-26-44, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 18 Feb 2011.
- J. Levin & L. Einav, 2012.
"Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report,"
Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 1.
- Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, 2010. "Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 145-162, Spring.
- Liran Einav & Jonathan D. Levin, 2010. "Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report," NBER Working Papers 15786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, 2010. "Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report," Discussion Papers 09-010, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- An, Yonghong, 2017. "Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: A measurement error approach," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 200(2), pages 326-343.
- Lu, Jiaxuan, 2023. "The economics of China’s between-city height competition: A regression discontinuity approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
- Nianqing Liu & Yao Luo, 2014. "A Nonparametric Test of Exogenous Participation in First-Price Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-519, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Jean-Fran�ois Gauthier & Art Shneyerov, 2018.
"Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 301-363.
- Robert Clark & Decio Coviello & Jean-Francois Gauthier & Art Shneyerov, 2018. "Bid Rigging And Entry Deterrence In Public Procurement: Evidence From An Investigation Into Collusion And Corruption In Quebec," Working Paper 1401, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Carnehl, Christoph & Weiergraeber, Stefan, 2023. "Bidder asymmetries in procurement auctions: Efficiency vs. information – Evidence from railway passenger services," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
More about this item
Keywords
Procurements; Collusion-Proof Auction; Local Polynomial Estimator;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
- C4 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2023-06-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-DES-2023-06-26 (Economic Design)
- NEP-IND-2023-06-26 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2023-06-26 (Regulation)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:248. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Laura Inés D Amato (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/redniar.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.