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The issue of instability in a simple policy game between the central bank and the representative union

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  • DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni
  • PAUWELS, Wilfried

Abstract

In the recent economic literature the independence of the central bank is often considered to be one of the most effective guarantees to archieve price stability. A strong theoretical basis of this proposition is that the monetary policy delegation given to an independent central bank is an optimal instrument to avoid the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. This paper investigates the stability properties of this solution in a simple game in which the private sector (i.e. the trade unions) and the public sector (i.e. the dentral bank) simultaneously interact. A representative monopoly union is considered, and – in line with the recent economic debate – two types of unions are investigated: i) the standard micro-founded trade union; ii) the inflation-averse trade union. In both cases, we find that the requirement that the Nash equilibrium be stable imposes a limit to the conservativeness of the central bank. Instability of the nash equilibrium reveals a strategic co-ordination failure between the public and the private sector.

Suggested Citation

  • DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni & PAUWELS, Wilfried, 2002. "The issue of instability in a simple policy game between the central bank and the representative union," Working Papers 2002009, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2002009
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. N. Acocella & G. Bartolomeo & Andrew Hallett, 2006. "Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 91-112, September.
    2. CAEYERS, Bet & PAUWELS, Wilfried, 2006. "Corporatism and macroeconomic stabilization policies," Working Papers 2006035, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    3. repec:cii:cepiei:2010-4ta is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hibbs Jr., Douglas A., 2008. "Labor market regimes and the effects of monetary policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 134-156, March.
    5. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2014. "Optimal Degree of Union Centralization," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 2(2), pages 201-211, December.
    6. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2002. "Sindacati, non neutralitˆ della moneta e giochi di politica economica," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 55(219), pages 263-277.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank independence; Inflation bias; Inflation spiral; Stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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