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Affine maximizers in domains with selfish valuations

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  • Swaprava Nath

    (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi)

  • Nath and Arunava Sen

    (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi)

Abstract

We consider the domain of selfish and Lipschitz continuous preferences over a "rich" allocation space and show that onto, strategyproof and allocation non-bossy social choice functions are affine maximizers. Roberts (1979) proves this result for a finite set of alternatives and an unrestricted valuation space. In this paper, we show that in a sub-domain of the unrestricted valuations with the additional assumption of allocation non-bossiness, using the richness of the allocations, the strategyproof social choice functions can be shown to be affine maximizers. We provide an example to show that allocation non-bossiness is indeed critical for this result. This work shows that an affine maximizer result needs certain amount of richness split across valuations and allocations.

Suggested Citation

  • Swaprava Nath & Nath and Arunava Sen, 2014. "Affine maximizers in domains with selfish valuations," Discussion Papers 14-12, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    • Handle: RePEc:alo:isipdp:14-12
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    Cited by:

    1. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Müller, Rudolf, 2015. "Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 114-131.

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