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From Drought to Flood: Environmental Constraints and the Political Economy of Civic Virtue

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  • Galassi, Francesco L.

Abstract

The paper models co-operative engagement under varying environmental constraints giving rise to different forms of collective action problems, specifically focussing on water management in pre-industrial societies. I show that societies where water availability is strongly seasonal develop no mechanism to encourage society-wide cooperative behaviour because the benefits of water storage are fully excludable. With pre-industrial technology water storage is a pure club good, and optimal club size can be shown to be very small under credible parameter values, converging to 1 in some cases (private good). The social consequences of the environmental constraint include strongly circumscribed co-operation and rent seeking. In contrast, areas where water management involved flood control and irrigation develop society-wide institutions based on self-sustaining co-operative engagement assisted by external policing. The model thus offers an explanation of varying levels of "civic virtue" in different areas.

Suggested Citation

  • Galassi, Francesco L., 2002. "From Drought to Flood: Environmental Constraints and the Political Economy of Civic Virtue," Economic Research Papers 269456, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269456
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269456
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