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A Positivist Approach to Pigouvian Taxes based on an Evolutionary Algorithm

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  • Simmons, Phil
  • Cacho, Oscar J.

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  • Simmons, Phil & Cacho, Oscar J., 2000. "A Positivist Approach to Pigouvian Taxes based on an Evolutionary Algorithm," Working Papers 12941, University of New England, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uneewp:12941
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12941
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baumol, William J, 1972. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 307-322, June.
    2. Cacho, Oscar J. & Simmons, Phil, 1999. "A genetic algorithm approach to farm investment," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 43(3), pages 1-18, September.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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