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Scope and Sustainability of Cooperation in Transboundary Water Sharing of the Volta River

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  • Bhaduri, Anik
  • Perez, Nicostrato D.
  • Liebe, Jens

Abstract

The paper explores the scope and sustainability of a self-enforcing cooperative agreement in the framework of a game theoretic model, where the upstream and downstream country, Burkina Faso and Ghana respectively in the Volta River Basin, bargain over the level of water abstraction in the upstream. In the model we consider the case where the downstream country, Ghana, offers a discounted price for energy export to the upstream country, Burkina Faso, to restrict its water abstraction rate in the upstream. The paper examines the benefits and sustainability of such self-enforcing cooperative arrangements between Ghana and Burkina Faso given stochastic uncertainty in the river flow. The findings of the paper suggest that at the present condition, the marginal benefit of Burkina Faso from increasing the water abstraction is much higher than that of Ghana’s marginal loss. However, the paper finds that if both countries’ water abstraction rates are at a much higher level, then the marginal loss of Ghana increases phenomenally from similar increase in water abstraction rate by Burkina Faso. Under such circumstances, there is an opportunity for Ghana to provide side payments in terms of discounted export price of power in order to motivate Burkina Faso to restrict water abstraction.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhaduri, Anik & Perez, Nicostrato D. & Liebe, Jens, 2008. "Scope and Sustainability of Cooperation in Transboundary Water Sharing of the Volta River," Discussion Papers 43324, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ubzefd:43324
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.43324
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2008. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 249-266, October.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    3. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    5. Bhaduri, Anik & Barbier, Edward B., 2008. "International water transfer and sharing: the case of the Ganges River," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 29-51, February.
    6. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2001. "Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Edward B. Barbier, 2004. "Water and Economic Growth," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 80(248), pages 1-16, March.
    8. Andreini, M. & van de Giesen, N. & van Edig, A. & Fosu, M. & Andah, W., 2000. "Volta Basin Water Balance," Discussion Papers 280265, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    9. Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jaehyung Lee & Heesun Jang, 2021. "Groundwater Extraction in the South Korea’s Jeju Island: A Real Options Game Approach under Price Uncertainty," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-11, March.
    2. Bhaduri, Anik & Manna, Utpal & Barbier, Edward B. & Liebe, Jens, 2009. "Cooperation in transboundary water sharing under climate change," Discussion Papers 51303, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).

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    Keywords

    Demand and Price Analysis; Environmental Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty;
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