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Effect of Regulatory Quality on Wood Pulp Imports by India

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  • Das, Joy
  • Tanger, Shaun
  • Kennedy, P. Lynn

Abstract

India is one of the largest importers of wood pulp in the world. The total value of wood pulp imported by India during 2004 was $ 171.9 million, which increased to approximately $744.5 million by 2013. With a population of about 1.2 billion people, the demand for paper and wood pulp is very high in India. Despite this harvesting timber for commercial use has been heavily restricted, therefore India has to import wood pulp to meet its growing domestic market demand. With a large population and limited resource access, India remains an attractive market for global wood pulp exporters. Using a pooled ordinary least squared (POLS) regression model of estimation, the study examines a panel of trade flows during 2009-2013, exploring the influence of Regulatory Quality on the pattern of wood pulp imports by India from 67 exporting countries. The effect of Regulatory Quality and other explanatory variables such as the distance between the exporting country and India, total forest area of exporting country, GDP and population indicators on imports of wood pulp by India is estimated with the help of the above-mentioned model. Moreover, the study also looks into the volume of exports from countries belonging to specific regions such as East Asia and Pacific, Latin America & the Caribbean, Europe & Central Asia, North America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Suggested Citation

  • Das, Joy & Tanger, Shaun & Kennedy, P. Lynn, 2016. "Effect of Regulatory Quality on Wood Pulp Imports by India," 2016 Annual Meeting, February 6-9, 2016, San Antonio, Texas 230097, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:saea16:230097
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.230097
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    Cited by:

    1. Das, Joy & Tanger, Shaun M. & Vlosky, Richard & Kennedy, P. Lynn, 2016. "The effect of regulatory quality on Indian forest products imports," Conference papers 332738, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.

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