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Crop Insurance Under Catastrophic Risk

Author

Listed:
  • Duncan, John
  • Myers, Robert J.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Duncan, John & Myers, Robert J., 1997. "Crop Insurance Under Catastrophic Risk," Staff Paper Series 201213, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:midasp:201213
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.201213
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/201213/files/agecon-msu-97-10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1986. "Measures of Risk Aversion and Comparative Statics of Industry Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 524-529, June.
    2. Raviv, Artur, 1979. "The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 84-96, March.
    3. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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