IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/iaae18/277231.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Who has the critical vote? Power ranking of MEPs in the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament

Author

Listed:
  • Kovacs, A.
  • Ferto, I.
  • Koczy, L.
  • Sziklai, B.
  • Nas, A.A.

Abstract

We analyze the voting power of the members of the agricultural committee of the European Parliament using a spatial Banzhaf power index. Using a novel dataset of roll-call votes in the current EP-term, we identify critical members whose votes are necessary to form winning coalitions. We found that committee members with formal positions, EP group coordinators as well as German, French, Italian and British members are powerful actors. Nevertheless, rapporteurs are not necessarily influential. We also concluded that members with moderate ideological position but from Member States with extreme agricultural importance are the most powerful ones. Acknowledgement :

Suggested Citation

  • Kovacs, A. & Ferto, I. & Koczy, L. & Sziklai, B. & Nas, A.A., 2018. "Who has the critical vote? Power ranking of MEPs in the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277231, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae18:277231
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.277231
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/277231/files/1419.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.277231?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez, J. R. & Jimenez, N. & Lopez, J. J., 2002. "Voting power in the European Union enlargement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 181-196, November.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
    3. Laszlo A. Koczy & Balazs Sziklai, 2013. "Electing the Pope," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1315, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    4. Neuhold, Christine, 2001. "The "Legislative Backbone" keeping the Institution upright? The Role of European Parliament Committees in the EU Policy-Making Process," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 5, August.
    5. Virginie Mamadouh & Tapio Raunio, 2003. "The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 333-351, April.
    6. Barr, Jason & Passarelli, Francesco, 2009. "Who has the power in the EU?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 339-366, May.
    7. Kóczy, László Á., 2012. "Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 152-158.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Imre Fertő & László Á Kóczy & Attila Kovács & Balázs R Sziklai, 0. "The power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 47(5), pages 1897-1919.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
    3. A. Palestini & G. Pignataro, 2013. "A multi-factor inequality approach to a transfer scheme: the case of Common Agricultural Policy," Working Papers wp891, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    4. Yukio Koriyama & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2013. "Optimal Apportionment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 584-608.
    5. Nikoleta Yordanova, 2011. "The European Parliament: In need of a theory," European Union Politics, , vol. 12(4), pages 597-617, December.
    6. Nikoleta Yordanova, 2009. "The Rationale behind Committee Assignment in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 253-280, June.
    7. Hang Luo & Lize Yang & Kourosh Houshmand, 2021. "Power Structure Dynamics in Growing Multilateral Development Banks: The Case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(1), pages 24-39, February.
    8. Matteo Migheli, 2016. "Measuring Representativeness in Different Electoral Systems, Using Italian and Dutch Data," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 723-748, July.
    9. Di Giannatale, Paolo & Passarelli, Francesco, 2013. "Voting chances instead of voting weights," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 164-173.
    10. Steffen Hurka, 2013. "Changing the output: The logic of amendment success in the European Parliament’s ENVI Committee," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 273-296, June.
    11. Dóra Gréta Petróczy & Mark Francis Rogers & László Á. Kóczy, 2022. "Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-25, February.
    12. Antonakakis, Nikolaos & Badinger, Harald & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2014. "From Rome to Lisbon and Beyond: Member States' Power, Efficiency, and Proportionality in the EU Council of Ministers," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 175, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    13. D'ora Gr'eta Petr'oczy & L'aszl'o Csat'o, 2023. "Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis," Papers 2312.16878, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    14. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, March.
    15. László Á. Kóczy, 2021. "Brexit and Power in the Council of the European Union," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-10, June.
    16. Thomas Jensen & Thomas Winzen, 2012. "Legislative negotiations in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(1), pages 118-149, March.
    17. Le Breton, Michel & Montero, Maria & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2012. "Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 159-173.
    18. Frits Hof & Walter Kern & Sascha Kurz & Kanstantsin Pashkovich & Daniël Paulusma, 2020. "Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 609-621, April.
    19. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2024. "Cooperative games with diversity constraints," Working Papers hal-04447373, HAL.
    20. László Á. Kóczy, 2016. "Power Indices When Players can Commit to Reject Coalitions," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 77-91, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Research Methods/ Statistical Methods;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:iaae18:277231. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iaaeeea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.