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Die Anreizwirkungen Von Transparenzsystemen Auf Die Gesetzestreue Der Lebensmittelunternehmen - Das Beispiel Des Pankower Smiley

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  • Fietz, Anica
  • Grüner, Sven
  • Bavorova, Miroslava

Abstract

Das wiederholte Auftreten von Lebensmittelskandalen und lebensmittelbedingten Erkrankungen hat das Verbrauchervertrauen in die Lebensmittelsicherheit und die für die Überwachung zuständigen Behörden nachhaltig erschüttert. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden weltweit zunehmend Transparenzsysteme als innovative Form zur Verhaltenssteuerung der Unternehmer genutzt, um die Gesetzestreue zu erhöhen. Um beurteilen zu können, welche Regulierungsstrategien sich als effektiv erweisen können, ist ein umfassendes Verständnis der Determinanten die das Verhalten tatsächlich beeinflussen nötig. In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir den Einfluss von materiellen und immateriellen Determinanten, im Kontext von verpflichtenden Transparenzsystemen im Lebensmittelbereich, auf unternehmerisches Entscheidungsverhalten. Eine solche Analyse ist gerade vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Diskussion um Transparenzsysteme in Deutschland von besonderer Bedeutung. Um die Wirkung der sog. „Smileysysteme“ bewerten zu können, haben wir eine empirische Untersuchung unter Lebensmittelunternehmen in Berlin Pankow, Lichtenberg und Marzahn-Hellersdorf durchgeführt, da dort ein deutschlandweit einmaliges Pilotprojekt, der verpflichtenden Veröffentlichungen der Ergebnisse der behördlichen Kontrollen, eingeführt wurde. Mit Hilfe eines Generalized Ordered Logit Modells wird der Einfluss der Verhaltensdeterminanten auf die Gesetzestreue (als abhängige Variable), in Abhängigkeit von der Art des Lebensmittelunternehmens (handelt es sich um Restaurants oder nicht), bestimmt. Wir finden wenige Determinanten die sich unabhängig von der Unternehmensart förderlich auf die Gesetzestreue der Unternehmer auswirken. Faktoren deren Wirkungen abhängig von der Art des Unternehmens variieren dominieren in unserem Modell. Nur eine Variable wirkt für alle Unternehmensgruppen und Unternehmer gleichartig in eine Richtung. In unserem Modell ist das Gefühl der Fairness/Angemessenheit des erhaltenen Smileys für alle Unternehmen ein positiv signifikanter Einflussfaktor auf die Gesetzestreue. Für alle Unternehmen gilt, umso fairer die erhaltene Bewertung (in Form des Smileys) empfunden wird, umso höher ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Gesetzestreue.

Suggested Citation

  • Fietz, Anica & Grüner, Sven & Bavorova, Miroslava, 2015. "Die Anreizwirkungen Von Transparenzsystemen Auf Die Gesetzestreue Der Lebensmittelunternehmen - Das Beispiel Des Pankower Smiley," 55th Annual Conference, Giessen, Germany, September 23-25, 2015 209187, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:gewi15:209187
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.209187
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    Keywords

    Agricultural and Food Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety;

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