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Anreizorientierte Entlohnung In Bezugsgenossenschaften: Eine Theoretische Analyse Einer Leistungsorientierten Entlohnung Zur Maximierung Des Monetären Mitgliedernutzens

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  • Zieseniss, Roland

Abstract

Bezugsgenossenschaften weisen durch das Verhältnis zu ihren Eigentümern, welche gleichzeitig Kunden des Unternehmens sind, erhebliche Unterschiede zu anderen Unternehmenstypen auf. Eine Entlohnung der genossenschaftlichen Unternehmensleitung sollte diese Besonderheit berücksichtigen. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert verschiedene Vergütungssysteme zur Steuerung der Unternehmensleitung in Genossenschaften. Dabei wird eine neu entwickelte genossenschaftsspezifische Vergütung mit einer Fixentlohnung und einer Entlohnung auf Basis des Genossenschaftsgewinns für eine Bezugsgenossenschaft verglichen.

Suggested Citation

  • Zieseniss, Roland, 2012. "Anreizorientierte Entlohnung In Bezugsgenossenschaften: Eine Theoretische Analyse Einer Leistungsorientierten Entlohnung Zur Maximierung Des Monetären Mitgliedernutzens," 52nd Annual Conference, Stuttgart, Germany, September 26-28, 2012 137177, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:gewi12:137177
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.137177
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    References listed on IDEAS

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