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Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter

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  • Revilla, Pablo

Abstract

This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent's preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. Under certain conditions on agents' preferences, we show that two possible situations in which, at least, one stable allocation exists, emerge. The first condition, called Group Togetherness, reflects real-life situations in which agents are more concerned about an acceptable set of colleagues than about the firm hiring them. The second one, Common Best Colleague, refers to markets in which a workers' ranking is accepted by workers and firms present in such markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Revilla, Pablo, 2007. "Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 7443, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemct:7443
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7443
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7443/files/wp070087.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2013. "Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1205-1229, April.
    2. Kominers, Scott Duke, 2010. "Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 773-780, March.
    3. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2010. "Status-Seeking In Coalitional Matching Problems," Economics Working Papers 10-02, Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast.
    4. Dimitrov, Dinko & Lazarova, Emiliya A., 2008. "Coalitional Matchings," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 37523, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    5. Dur, Umut Mert & Wiseman, Thomas, 2019. "School choice with neighbors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 101-109.
    6. Kucuksenel Serkan, 2011. "Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, September.

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    Keywords

    Marketing;

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