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Strategic Network Interdiction

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  • Hong, Sunghoon

Abstract

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on network interdiction.

Suggested Citation

  • Hong, Sunghoon, 2011. "Strategic Network Interdiction," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 108252, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemcl:108252
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.108252
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    Cited by:

    1. McBride, Michael & Hewitt, David, 2013. "The enemy you can’t see: An investigation of the disruption of dark networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 32-50.
    2. Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2015. "From Sabotage Games to Border Protection," CEI Working Paper Series 2015-2, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. William M. Kroshl & Shahram Sarkani & Thomas A Mazzuchi, 2015. "Efficient Allocation of Resources for Defense of Spatially Distributed Networks Using Agent‐Based Simulation," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(9), pages 1690-1705, September.

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    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

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