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Non-Linear Utility Pricing and Targeting the Poor

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  • Kanbur, Ravi
  • Tarkiainen, Ritva
  • Tuomala, Matti

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Kanbur, Ravi & Tarkiainen, Ritva & Tuomala, Matti, 1998. "Non-Linear Utility Pricing and Targeting the Poor," Working Papers 179318, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:cudawp:179318
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.179318
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sanford V. Berg & William E. Roth, 1976. "Some Remarks on Residential Electricity Consumption and Social Rate Restructuring," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 690-698, Autumn.
    2. Mirrlees, J. A., 1976. "Optimal tax theory : A synthesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 327-358, November.
    3. repec:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:258:p:179-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    5. Roberts, Kevin W S, 1979. "Welfare Considerations of Nonlinear Pricing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(353), pages 66-83, March.
    6. Brown,Stephen J. & Sibley,David Sumner, 1986. "The Theory of Public Utility Pricing," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521314008, October.
    7. Dionissis Dimopoulos, 1981. "Pricing Schemes for Regulated Enterprises and Their Welfare Implications in the Case of Electricity," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 185-200, Spring.
    8. Meyer, Robert A, 1975. "Monopoly Pricing and Capacity Choice under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 326-337, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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