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Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Kulmala, Soile
  • Levontin, Polina
  • Lindroos, Marko
  • Pintassilgo, Pedro

Abstract

This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial cooperation is stable under a specific sharing scheme. It is also shown that substantial economic benefits could have been realised by reallocating the fishing effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Kulmala, Soile & Levontin, Polina & Lindroos, Marko & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2010. "Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation," 2010 Conference (54th), February 10-12, 2010, Adelaide, Australia 59094, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aare10:59094
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.59094
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Pham Do, K.H. & Folmer, H., 2003. "International Fisheries Agreements : The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation," Other publications TiSEM 1b8f7ba5-c854-48f4-8ec0-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Marita Laukkanen, 2001. "A Bioeconomic Analysis of the Northern Baltic Salmon Fishery: Coexistence versus Exclusion of Competing Sequential Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(3), pages 293-315, March.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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