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A competitive bidding process with landholder cooperation for landscape linkage

Author

Listed:
  • Windle, Jill
  • Rolfe, John
  • Whitten, Stuart M.
  • McCosker, Juliana

Abstract

There has been growing interest in the use of market-like instruments to achieve cost effective environmental outcomes, and a range of new tools are being explored. While competitive processes such as BushTender have been successfully designed to establish conservation contracts on private land, it is much more difficult to design competitive tenders that also require cooperation between landholders. This paper reports on a series of experimental workshops held with landholders in central-western Queensland to design an auction process that would protect biodiversity in a vegetation corridor. The research focused on options to develop a corridor where landholders need to cooperate on location options within a competitive bidding process.

Suggested Citation

  • Windle, Jill & Rolfe, John & Whitten, Stuart M. & McCosker, Juliana, 2005. "A competitive bidding process with landholder cooperation for landscape linkage," 2005 Conference (49th), February 9-11, 2005, Coff's Harbour, Australia 139301, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aare05:139301
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.139301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrea Cattaneo, 2003. "The Pursuit of Efficiency and Its Unintended Consequences: Contract Withdrawals in the Environmental Quality Incentives Program," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 25(2), pages 449-469.
    2. Stoneham, Gary & Chaudhri, Vivek & Ha, Arthur & Strappazzon, Loris, 2003. "Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria’s BushTender trial," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1-24.
    3. Michael A. Taylor & Brent Sohngen & Alan Randall & Helen Pushkarskaya, 2004. "Group Contracts for Voluntary Nonpoint Source Pollution Reductions: Evidence from Experimental Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1196-1202.
    4. Jason F. Shogren, 2004. "Incentive Mechanism Testbeds: Discussion," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1218-1219.
    5. Parkhurst, Gregory M. & Shogren, Jason F. & Bastian, Chris & Kivi, Paul & Donner, Jennifer & Smith, Rodney B. W., 2002. "Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 305-328, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brett Bryan & Jeffery Connor et al, 2005., 2005. "Catchment Care - Developing an Auction Process for Biodiversity and Water Quality Gains. Volume 1 - Report," Natural Resource Management Economics 05_004, Policy and Economic Research Unit, CSIRO Land and Water, Adelaide, Australia.
    2. Justin Dijk & Erik Ansink & Daan van Soest, 2017. "Buyouts and Agglomeration Bonuses in Wildlife Corridor Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-036/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.

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