IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aaea18/273858.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Policy Response to Food Fraud

Author

Listed:
  • Meerza, Syed Imran Ali
  • Giannakas, Konstantinos
  • Yiannaka, Amalia

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Meerza, Syed Imran Ali & Giannakas, Konstantinos & Yiannaka, Amalia, 2018. "Optimal Policy Response to Food Fraud," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 273858, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea18:273858
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273858
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273858/files/Abstracts_18_05_23_21_02_24_97__129_93_232_133_0.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.273858?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Olivier Bonroy & Christos Constantatos, 2015. "On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 97(1), pages 239-259.
    3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
    4. Soham Baksi & Pinaki Bose, 2007. "Credence Goods, Efficient Labelling Policies, and Regulatory Enforcement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(2), pages 411-430, June.
    5. Giannakas, Konstantinos & Fulton, Murray, 2000. "The economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 75-90, January.
    6. Hamilton, Stephen F. & Zilberman, David, 2006. "Green markets, eco-certification, and equilibrium fraud," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 627-644, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Schaefer, K. Aleks & Scheitrum, Daniel & Nes, Kjersti, 2018. "International sourcing decisions in the wake of a food scandal," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 48-57.
    2. Hao, Na & Wang, Holly & Zhu, Beiqi, 2022. "Can food ordering apps help combat food fraud through providing food safety information? Consumer responses to gutter-oil-free claim on Koubei," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 26(1), September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ibrahima BARRY & Olivier BONROY & Paolo G. GARELLA, 2014. "Labelling by a for-Profit Certifier," Departmental Working Papers 2014-07, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano, revised 27 Feb 2016.
    2. Robson Fernandes Soares & Edson Ronaldo Guarido Filho, 2021. "Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Organizations: A Narrative Review," RAC - Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Journal of Contemporary Administration), ANPAD - Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração, vol. 25(6), pages 190149-1901.
    3. Jason Walter & Yang-Ming Chang, 2017. "Green certification, heterogeneous producers, and green consumers: a welfare analysis of environmental regulations," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 333-361, December.
    4. Brécard, Dorothée, 2014. "Consumer confusion over the profusion of eco-labels: Lessons from a double differentiation model," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 64-84.
    5. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    6. Gambelli, Danilo & Solfanelli, Francesco & Zanoli, Raffaele & Zorn, Alexander & Lippert, Christian & Dabbert, Stephan, 2014. "Non-compliance in organic farming: A cross-country comparison of Italy and Germany," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(P2), pages 449-458.
    7. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.
    8. Charles Mason, 2011. "Eco-Labeling and Market Equilibria with Noisy Certification Tests," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(4), pages 537-560, April.
    9. Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
    10. Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Criminal solicitation, entrapment, and the enforcement of law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 258-268.
    11. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2018. "Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 284-307.
    12. Yokessa, Maïmouna & Marette, Stéphan, 2019. "A Review of Eco-labels and their Economic Impact," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 13(1-2), pages 119-163, April.
    13. Hasker, Kevin & Okten, Cagla, 2008. "Intermediaries and corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 103-115, July.
    14. Giovanni Immordino & Marco Pagano, 2010. "Legal Standards, Enforcement, and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 1104-1132, September.
    15. Garoupa, Nuno & Klerman, Daniel, 2004. "Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 219-225, June.
    16. Giovanni Immordino & Marco Pagano & Michele Polo, 2006. "Norm Flexibility and Private Initiative," Working Papers 314, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    17. Faisal Jamil & Eatzaz Ahmad, 2013. "An Economic Investigation of Corruption and Electricity Theft," PIDE-Working Papers 2013:92, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    18. Keith Blackburn & Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Maria Paola Rana, 2015. "Organized Crime, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 210, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    19. Pradiptyo, Rimawan, 2012. "Does Corruption Pay in Indonesia? If So, Who are Benefited the Most?," MPRA Paper 41384, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Konstantinos Giannakas, 2003. "Economics of export subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 47(4), pages 541-562, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Food and Agricultural Policy Analysis; Industrial Org./Supply Chain Management; Agribusiness Economics and Management;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea18:273858. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.