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Política de endurecimiento de la restricción presupuestaria provincial. Argentina. 1988-2021

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  • Porto Alberto
  • Di Gresia Luciano
  • Puig Jorge

Abstract

Se estudia el impacto de medidas del gobierno nacional destinadas a “endurecer” la restricción presupuestaria provincial en el periodo 1988-2021. Las dos vías principales fueron la transferencia de gastos y las disminuciones en la coparticipación. Para las finanzas en el agregado de provincias el impacto negativo -menores recursos y más gastos- fue creciente hasta 2015 y disminuyó desde 2016. Levantando el “velo de la centralización” se observa que el impacto negativo no se distribuyó uniformemente detectándose incluso que algunas jurisdicciones fueron ganadoras junto con el gobierno nacional (La Rioja y Santa Cruz, 1,82 y 0,39 de sus PBG). Se estimó econométricamente la reacción de las provincias debido a esas políticas nacionales; los resultados muestran que las provincias aumentaron sus recursos propios y disminuyeron los gastos y el déficit, con gran variabilidad a nivel de provincias. Las políticas nacionales tuvieron como fundamento la existencia de “restricción financiera blanda” suponiendo que el régimen de transferencias genera “pereza recaudatoria” e incentiva “gasto excesivo”; desde ese punto de vista habrían sido exitosas. Pero el aumento de la recaudación propia se debió a un notable crecimiento de la recaudación de Ingresos Brutos transformado en el “villano” del sistema tributario argentino. El ajuste del gasto también deja dudas: recayó sobre los gastos de capital implicando deterioro de la infraestructura. Encontrar una solución para el tema pendiente de la relación naciónprovincias es crucial para el funcionamiento del federalismo argentino y para garantizar una adecuada provisión de bienes que afectan en forma directa el bienestar de los ciudadanos y requiere un cuidadoso diseño que contemple todos los efectos y los “trade offs” entre los lados positivos y negativos.

Suggested Citation

  • Porto Alberto & Di Gresia Luciano & Puig Jorge, 2023. "Política de endurecimiento de la restricción presupuestaria provincial. Argentina. 1988-2021," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4685, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
  • Handle: RePEc:aep:anales:4685
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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