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La tragedia de los políticos y los votantes: Cuando el crecimiento económico se convierte en una utopía

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  • Flavia Poinsot

Abstract

La tragedia de los comunes se puede utilizar para describir otra tragedia, la de los políticos y los votantes. Cada uno de estos actores, imbuido de su propio interés en un escenario con un marco institucional defectuoso, busca sacar ventajas cada uno para sí, los votantes aumento de consumo actual y los políticos aumento de votos en el presente. Es en este escenario que los votantes, en función de sus conocimientos, creencias e ideas, eligen políticos que diseñan políticas que queriendo maximizar el bienestar explotan en forma ilimitada al recurso limitado, la capacidad del stock de capital y de trabajo para sostener una trayectoria de crecimiento sostenido. Dadas las características inherentes de las políticas, bajo cierto marco institucional, éstas pueden depredar los stocks de capital y de trabajo que entonces no pueden sustentar variables flujos como la inversión en cantidad suficiente para colocar al país en una trayectoria de crecimiento sostenible. Al final, todos pierden porque se devastan los stocks, disminuyendo los flujos de inversión, disminuyendo el bienestar y alejando al país de toda trayectoria de crecimiento. El rol de las instituciones es central al facilitar la coordinación intertemporal de las políticas y restringir los comportamientos de los actores siendo idóneas como instrumentos de compromiso

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  • Flavia Poinsot, 2022. "La tragedia de los políticos y los votantes: Cuando el crecimiento económico se convierte en una utopía," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4586, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
  • Handle: RePEc:aep:anales:4586
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    • B3 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals
    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology

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