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Risk Management and Remuneration Policy in Financial Sector: A Regulatory Perspective

In: 7th International OFEL Conference on Governance, Management and Entrepreneurship: Embracing Diversity in Organisations. April 5th - 6th, 2019, Dubrovnik, Croatia

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  • Vuksanović Herceg, Iva

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  • Vuksanović Herceg, Iva, 2019. "Risk Management and Remuneration Policy in Financial Sector: A Regulatory Perspective," 7th International OFEL Conference on Governance, Management and Entrepreneurship: Embracing Diversity in Organisations (Dubrovnik, 2019), in: 7th International OFEL Conference on Governance, Management and Entrepreneurship: Embracing Diversity in Organisations. April 5th - 6th, 2019, Dubrovn, pages 98-109, Governance Research and Development Centre (CIRU), Zagreb.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ofel19:196074
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    2. Engel, Ellen & Hayes, Rachel M. & Wang, Xue, 2007. "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and firms' going-private decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 116-145, September.
    3. Bargeron, Leonce L. & Lehn, Kenneth M. & Zutter, Chad J., 2010. "Sarbanes-Oxley and corporate risk-taking," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1-2), pages 34-52, February.
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