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Platform Competition: Market Structure and Pricing

In: The Changing Postal Environment

Author

Listed:
  • Claire Borsenberger

    (Direction of Regulation and Economic Studies – Le Groupe La Poste)

  • Helmuth Cremer

    (Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole)

  • Denis Joram

    (Direction of Regulation and Economic Studies – Le Groupe La Poste)

  • Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

    (Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole)

  • Estelle Malavolti

    (Toulouse School of Economics, ENAC)

Abstract

The significant development of e-commerce and Internet marketplaces has provided numerous benefits to both retailers and customers. In addition, it has been a boon for delivery operators, allowing postal services to compensate at least in part revenue losses due to declining mail volumes. However, increasing concentration in e-commerce and the worry that market power may be extended into adjacent markets has turned into a major concern of policy makers and competition authorities. While many argue that traditional regulatory or competition policy may have to be amended within the context of platforms, there are so far few rigorous studies that can provide guidance.

Suggested Citation

  • Claire Borsenberger & Helmuth Cremer & Denis Joram & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Estelle Malavolti, 2020. "Platform Competition: Market Structure and Pricing," Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, in: Pier Luigi Parcu & Timothy J. Brennan & Victor Glass (ed.), The Changing Postal Environment, pages 225-240, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:topchp:978-3-030-34532-7_17
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-34532-7_17
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Claire Borsenberger & Helmuth Cremer & Denis Joram & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2018. "Vertical Integration in the E-Commerce Sector," Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, in: Pier Luigi Parcu & Timothy J. Brennan & Victor Glass (ed.), New Business and Regulatory Strategies in the Postal Sector, pages 143-160, Springer.
    2. Pier Luigi Parcu & Timothy J. Brennan & Victor Glass (ed.), 2018. "New Business and Regulatory Strategies in the Postal Sector," Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, Springer, number 978-3-030-02937-1, October.
    3. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 33, pages 2145-2220, Elsevier.
    4. Markus Reisinger & Emanuele Tarantino, 2015. "Vertical integration, foreclosure, and productive efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 461-479, September.
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