IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/sprchp/978-0-387-24243-9_13.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Failure of Bayesian Updating in Repeated Bilateral Bargaining

In: Experimental Business Research

Author

Listed:
  • Ching Chyi Lee

    (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

  • Eythan Weg

    (Purdue University)

  • Rami Zwick

    (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

Abstract

Ever since Camerer and Weigelt (1988) concluded in their important experimental work that “sequential equilibrium describes actual behavior well enough,” we might be tempted to use this theory confidently in various domains. To assess the robustness of the above conclusion, the present study attempts to explore Bayesian updating in a bilateral negotiated sale setup injected with a whiff of an ultimatum aroma. We conclude that the ultimatum nature of the basic game tends to overwhelm rational behavior on the part of the sellers and that buyers are not cognizant of favorable prices occurring later in the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Ching Chyi Lee & Eythan Weg & Rami Zwick, 2005. "Failure of Bayesian Updating in Repeated Bilateral Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Amnon Rapoport & Rami Zwick (ed.), Experimental Business Research, chapter 0, pages 249-260, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-24243-9_13
    DOI: 10.1007/0-387-24243-0_13
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Feri, Francesco & Gantner, Anita, 2011. "Bargaining or searching for a better price? - An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 376-399, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-24243-9_13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.