Why Both Game Theory and Reliability Theory Are Important in Defending Infrastructure against Intelligent Attacks
In: Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats
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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-87767-9_1
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Zhang, Chi & Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel & Wang, Jianhui, 2015. "Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy – A discrete simultaneous game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(1), pages 212-221.
- Chi Zhang & Jose Ramirez-Marquez, 2013. "Protecting critical infrastructures against intentional attacks: a two-stage game with incomplete information," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 244-258.
- Louis Anthony (Tony) Cox, Jr., 2009. "Game Theory and Risk Analysis," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(8), pages 1062-1068, August.
- Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel & Li, Qing, 2018. "Locating and protecting facilities from intentional attacks using secrecyAuthor-Name: Zhang, Chi," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 51-62.
- Anthony M. Barrett, 2010. "Cost Effectiveness of On-Site Chlorine Generation for Chlorine Truck Attack Prevention," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 366-377, December.
- Louis Anthony (Tony) Cox, Jr, 2008. "Some Limitations of “Risk = Threat × Vulnerability × Consequence” for Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(6), pages 1749-1761, December.
- Li, Qing & Li, Mingchu & Gong, Zhongqiang & Tian, Yuan & Zhang, Runfa, 2022. "Locating and protecting interdependent facilities to hedge against multiple non-cooperative limited choice attackers," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
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Keywords
Game Theory; Critical Infrastructure; Reliability Theory; Quantitative Risk Assessment; Conditional Risk;All these keywords.
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