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The Political Economy of Leviathan

In: Economic Policy in Theory and Practice

Author

Listed:
  • Ronald Findlay
  • John D. Wilson

Abstract

The theory of the state is something that most economists have been content to leave to the political scientists. When the state does appear in economic analysis it usually does so in one or the other of the following roles. One is as a benign and omniscient authority that obligingly imposes taxes, bounties or other measures at just the right level to offset some ‘distortion’ in the price mechanism, owing say to externalities of one sort or another, so as to assure Pareto-efficiency of market outcomes. This aspect of the state in economics is particularly pronounced in what may be called the Pigou—Meade tradition in welfare economics, which has dominated the modern developments of public finance and international trade. The other, dramatically opposed role of the state in standard economic analysis, is as the culpable or innocent tool of malevolent special interests, that instead of correcting distortions à la Pigou and Meade is the very source of them, e.g. minimum wage or usury laws, rent control, tariffs and so on. Conservative economists denounce these interventions on both equity and efficiency grounds, while liberals are apt to be apologetic, sympathising with real or alleged distributional objectives but usually pointing out that alternative (not always feasible) measures could be used that would achieve these goals at a lower cost in efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald Findlay & John D. Wilson, 1987. "The Political Economy of Leviathan," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka (ed.), Economic Policy in Theory and Practice, chapter 8, pages 289-306, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-18584-9_8
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-18584-9_8
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Salvatore Ercolano & Carmelo Petraglia & Domenico Scalera, 2024. "Autonomia differenziata e omogeneità regionale delle preferenze. Un riscontro empirico," Regional Economy, , vol. 8(Q1), pages 3-10.
    2. Richard H. Clarida & Ronald Findlay, 1991. "Endogenous Comparative Advantage, Government, and the Pattern of Trade," NBER Working Papers 3813, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ronald Findlay, 1995. "Infrastructure, Human Capital and International Trade," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 131(III), pages 289-301, September.
    4. Mats Lundahl & Fredrik Sjöholm, 2009. "Population growth and job creation in Timor-Leste," Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 90-104.
    5. Göbel, Jürgen, 2009. "In search of an appropriate tax base for local Leviathans," MPRA Paper 13940, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Carlos Seiglie & Luis Locay, 1993. "The Political Economy of State-Owned Enterprises," Annual Proceedings, The Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, vol. 3.
    7. Wilson, John Douglas, 2005. "Welfare-improving competition for mobile capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-18, January.
    8. John Douglas Wilson & Roger H. Gordon, 2003. "Expenditure Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 399-417, April.
    9. Kong Weng Ho & Hian Teck Hoon, 1998. "Productivity Growth and Public Sector Employment," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 42(2), pages 73-79, October.
    10. Aristomène Varoudakis & Claude Jessua, 1996. "Régimes non démocratiques et croissance : théorie et estimation," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 831-840.
    11. Monissen, Hans G., 1999. "Explorations of the Laffer curve," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 9, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.

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