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Equilibrium in a Matching Market with General Preferences

In: Equilibrium and Dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Ahmet Alkan

Abstract

One of the earliest matching market models to appear was in David Gale’s The Theory of Linear Economic Models (1960) as an interpretation of the optimal assignment problem and its dual. This covered, as it is sometimes called, the ‘linear homogeneous case’ where a buyer’s utility for money is constant and independent of the object he may be assigned. The model has since been substantially generalised and shown to have various remarkable properties, some of which we will refer to below. Our purpose in this study is to give a proof of existence of competitive equilibrium in a matching market allowing rather general preferences, and then to construct a procedure whereby an equilibrium can be reached in an auction. The latter in fact generalises a ‘multi-item auction’ for the linear homogeneous case by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986).

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmet Alkan, 1992. "Equilibrium in a Matching Market with General Preferences," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Mukul Majumdar (ed.), Equilibrium and Dynamics, chapter 1, pages 1-16, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-11696-6_1
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-11696-6_1
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    Cited by:

    1. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2019. "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market," ISER Discussion Paper 1047, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2002. "A Simultaneous Descending Bid Auction for Multiple Items and Unitary Demand," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 56(3), July.
    3. Tierney, Ryan, 2019. "The problem of multiple commons: A market design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-27.

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