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U.S. Political Pressure and Economic Liberalization in East Asia

In: Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia

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  • Takatoshi Ito

Abstract

The object of this paper is two-fold. First, the paper evalutes U.S. pressure for economic liberalization in Japan. Second, its implications for economic and political aspects of the East Asian regional future will be discussed. I will argue that there have been three types of the U.S. pressure on Japan: (i) The traditional type with VERs and other export-limiting measures on Japan; (ii) The SII/MOSS -type in that market access of Japan, which improves the Japanese consumers' welfare, is discussed; and (iii) The result-oriented type where unilateral U.S. gains are sought. The pressure from the United States will not turn Japan to the Asian countories for now. Japan still lacks a market to absorb Asian goods or an idea and principle to lead the Asian countries. However, if EC and NAFTA becomes a reality, the Asian bloc may be formed as a reaction to them.
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Suggested Citation

  • Takatoshi Ito, 1993. "U.S. Political Pressure and Economic Liberalization in East Asia," NBER Chapters, in: Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia, pages 391-422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:7843
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    Cited by:

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    2. Shujiro Urata, 2020. "US–Japan Trade Frictions: The Past, the Present, and Implications for the US–China Trade War," Asian Economic Policy Review, Japan Center for Economic Research, vol. 15(1), pages 141-159, January.

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