IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/6942.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Organizational Form and Insurance Company Performance: Stocks versus Mutuals

In: The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Patricia Born
  • William M. Gentry
  • W. Kip Viscusi
  • Richard J. Zeckhauser

Abstract

One unusual feature of the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry is the coexistence of stock and mutual companies. This paper explores the performance of these forms in the industry through a dynamic assessment of how mutual and stock insurance companies respond to differences in their underwriting environment. Agency theories suggest that the stock company may be more 'opportunistic' and less obligated to their insureds than mutuals. This article assesses the responses by stock and mutual firms to changes in the underwriting environment from 1984 to 1991, using measures of individual firms' performance, by state and by line, in eight different lines of insurance. Stock companies are more likely than mutuals to reduce their business in unprofitable situations, and have higher losses than mutuals for a given amount of premiums.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Born & William M. Gentry & W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1998. "Organizational Form and Insurance Company Performance: Stocks versus Mutuals," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance, pages 167-192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:6942
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6942.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    2. Richard J. Zeckhauser & John Pound, 1990. "Are Large Shareholders Effective Monitors? An Investigation of Share Ownership and Corporate Performance," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 149-180, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Nancy E. Wallace, 1994. "The Determinants of Efficiency and Solvency in Savings and Loans," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 361-381, Autumn.
    4. Hansmann, Henry, 1985. "The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus Stock," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 125-153, Spring.
    5. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    6. Lamm-Tennant, Joan & Starks, Laura T, 1993. "Stock versus Mutual Ownership Structures: The Risk Implications," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(1), pages 29-46, January.
    7. Mayers, David & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1981. "Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in Insurance Markets," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 407-434, July.
    8. Cummins, J. David & Weiss, Mary A., 1993. "Measuring cost efficiency in the property-liability insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 463-481, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Patricia Born & W. Viscusi, 2006. "The catastrophic effects of natural disasters on insurance markets," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 55-72, September.
    2. Isabelle Hirtzlin, 2010. "Attaining the "Health for all" commitment. Which model for health insurance ? Some lessons from the European and USA experiences," Working Papers hal-00942771, HAL.
    3. Fabrice Roth, 1998. "Structures de propriété, pouvoir discrétionnaire managérial et choix d'activité dans l'assurance dommages en France," Working Papers CREGO 0980301, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    4. Isabelle Hirtzlin, 2010. "Attaining the "Health for all" commitment. Which model for health insurance ? Some lessons from the European and USA experiences," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00942771, HAL.
    5. J.Cook & S.Deakin & A.Hughes, 2001. "Mutuality and Corporate Governance: The Evolution of UK Building Societies Following Deregulation," Working Papers wp205, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    6. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1996. "Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets and Uninsurable Risks," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-12, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Nekby, Lena, 2001. "Pure vs. Mutual Sick Insurance Societies. Evidence from Swedish Historical Data," Research Papers in Economics 2001:10, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fabrice Roth, 2012. "Crise et régulation des marchés financiers : Quel impact sur les formes mutuelles dans l'assurance ?," Working Papers halshs-00692342, HAL.
    2. repec:mth:ijafr8:v:8:y:2018:i:2:p:152-165 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Noel O'Sullivan, 1998. "Ownership and Governance in the Insurance Industry: A Review of the Theory and Evidence," The Service Industries Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(4), pages 145-161, October.
    4. J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss & Hongmin Zi, 1998. "Organizational form and efficiency: an analysis of stock and mutual property-liability insurers," Working Papers 98-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    5. Wise William, 2020. "The Importance of the Efficiency of Mutual Life Insurers: A Comparison to Stock Life Insurers," Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia, Sciendo, vol. 20(1), pages 474-505, June.
    6. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    7. Berger, Allen N & Cummins, J David & Weiss, Mary A, 1997. "The Coexistence of Multiple Distribution Systems for Financial Services: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(4), pages 515-546, October.
    8. Yan, Jia & Liu, John J. & Li, Kevin X., 2008. "Threshold control of mutual insurance with limited commitment," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 108-115, August.
    9. Chia-Ling Ho & Gene Lai & Sangyong Han & Licheng Jin, 2022. "Organisational structure, corporate governance and reinsurance decisions in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 47(4), pages 737-784, October.
    10. J. Cummins & Hongmin Zi, 1998. "Comparison of Frontier Efficiency Methods: An Application to the U.S. Life Insurance Industry," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 131-152, October.
    11. Fabrice Roth, 2000. "Gouvernement des entreprises et stratégie du dirigeant:une étude clinique dans le secteur de l'assurance," Working Papers CREGO 1000701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    12. Lu, Erin P. & Lai, Gene C. & Ma, Qingzhong, 2017. "Organizational structure, risk-based capital requirements, and the sales of downgraded bonds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 51-68.
    13. Fabrice Roth, 2000. "Gouvernement des entreprises et stratégie du dirigeant:une étude clinique dans le secteur de l'assurance," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 3(4), pages 179-199, December.
    14. Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & J. Tyler Leverty, 2010. "The Demise of the Mutual Organizational Form: An Investigation of the Life Insurance Industry," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(6), pages 1011-1036, September.
    15. Seog S. Hun, 2006. "Limited Competition, Information Asymmetry, and Organizational Forms," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-14, February.
    16. Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 1999. "An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thai firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 7(3-4), pages 371-403, August.
    17. J. David Cummins & Giuseppe Turchetti, 1996. "Productivity and Technical Efficiency in the Italian Insurance Industry," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-10, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    18. Attiya Y. Javid & Robina Iqbal, 2010. "Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Corporate Valuation, Ownership and Financing," PIDE-Working Papers 2010:57, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    19. Jean-Noël Ory & Yasmina Lemzeri, 2008. "An appraisal of « cooperative banks » versus « plc banks » efficiency: a focus on the French situation and a European perspective," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0801, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2008.
    20. J.Cook & S.Deakin & A.Hughes, 2001. "Mutuality and Corporate Governance: The Evolution of UK Building Societies Following Deregulation," Working Papers wp205, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    21. Valnek, Tomas, 1999. "The comparative performance of mutual building societies and stock retail banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 925-938, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:6942. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.