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Strategic delegation in oligopoly

In: Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Kopel
  • Mario Pezzino

Abstract

This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Kopel & Mario Pezzino, 2018. "Strategic delegation in oligopoly," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 10, pages 248-285, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:17978_10
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kopel, Michael & Marini, Marco A., 2022. "Mandatory disclosure of managerial contracts in NGOs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 199(C), pages 65-85.
    2. Michael Kopel & Eva Maria Putz, 2021. "Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(7), pages 1645-1655, October.
    3. Habiger, Peter & Kopel, Michael, 2020. "Strategic delegation in successive oligopolies with differentiated firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    4. Arvaniti, Maria & Habla, Wolfgang, 2021. "The political economy of negotiating international carbon markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    5. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2018. "Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 244-250.
    6. Domenico De Giovanni & Fabio Lamantia, 2017. "Evolutionary dynamics of a duopoly game with strategic delegation and isoelastic demand," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 27(5), pages 877-903, November.
    7. Michael Kopel & Marco A. Marini, 2020. "Mandatory Disclosure of Managerial Contracts in Nonprofit Organizations," Working Papers 2020.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Spycher, Sarah & Winkler, Ralph, 2022. "Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    9. Yasuhiro Arai & Noriaki Matsushima, 2023. "The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 114-132, February.
    10. Cong Pan & DongJoon Lee & Kangsik Choi, 2020. "Firms’ strategic delegation with heterogeneous consumers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 199-221, December.
    11. Choi Kangsik & Lee Ki-Dong & Lim Seonyoung, 2020. "Managerial Delegation of Competing Vertical Chains with Vertical Externality," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-18, June.
    12. Denis Claude & Mabel Tidball, 2020. "Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Pierre-Olivier Pineau & Simon Sigué & Sihem Taboubi (ed.), Games in Management Science, pages 165-186, Springer.
    13. Kopel, Michael & Putz, Eva Maria, 2021. "Why socially concerned firms use low-powered managerial incentives: A complementary explanation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 473-482.
    14. Michael Kopel & Eva Maria Putz, 2021. "Sharing managerial contract information in a vertically related market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(4), pages 1037-1047, June.

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    Economics and Finance;

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