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The strange history of social choice

In: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

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  • Iain McLean

Abstract

This Handbook provides an overview of interdisciplinary research related to social choice and voting that is intended for a broad audience. Expert contributors from various fields present critical summaries of the existing literature, including intuitive explanations of technical terminology and well-known theorems, suggesting new directions for research.

Suggested Citation

  • Iain McLean, 2015. "The strange history of social choice," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 2, pages 15-34, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15584_2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emerson Niou, 1987. "A note on Nanson's rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 191-193, January.
    2. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 89-110, April.
    3. Norman Schofield, 2013. "The “probability of a fit choice”," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(2), pages 129-150, June.
    4. McLean, Iain & Urken, Arnold B, 1992. "Did Jefferson or Madison Understand Condorcet's Theory of Social Choice?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 445-457, June.
    5. Schofield,Norman, 2006. "Architects of Political Change," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521832021, January.
    6. Eerik Lagerspetz, 1986. "Pufendorf on collective decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 179-182, January.
    7. Schofield,Norman, 2006. "Architects of Political Change," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521539722, January.
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