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Market Failures within Poor Institutions: The Effects of Bureaucrats’ Rent-seeking Activity

In: Institutional and Social Dynamics of Growth and Distribution

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  • Davide Infante
  • Janna Smirnova

Abstract

Institutional and Social Dynamics of Growth and Distribution presents a set of original contributions to the much-debated issues of long-run economic growth in relation to institutional and social progress.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Infante & Janna Smirnova, 2010. "Market Failures within Poor Institutions: The Effects of Bureaucrats’ Rent-seeking Activity," Chapters, in: Neri Salvadori (ed.), Institutional and Social Dynamics of Growth and Distribution, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13365_5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Panibratov, Andrei & Chen, Xinchuan, 2018. "The role of informal institutions in the internationalization process of Chinese and Russian firms," Working Papers 15115, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University.
    2. Infante, Davide & Smirnova, Janna, 2009. "Rent-seeking under a weak institutional environment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 118-121, September.

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