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Autonomía del Banco de la República en la Constitución de 1991 y en la Ley 31 de 1992

In: Historia del Banco de la República 1923-2015

Author

Listed:
  • Boada-Ortiz, Alberto
  • Gómez-Restrepo, Carolina
  • Ocampo-Duque, Marcela

Abstract

Analiza el objetivo del banco central desde la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 1991 cuando se generó el espacio propicio para replantear la función constitucional del Banco de la República. Además el documento incluye la legislación, los datos de las sentencias de la Corte Constitucional y del Consejo de Estado sobre el tema.

Suggested Citation

  • Boada-Ortiz, Alberto & Gómez-Restrepo, Carolina & Ocampo-Duque, Marcela, 2017. "Autonomía del Banco de la República en la Constitución de 1991 y en la Ley 31 de 1992," Chapters, in: Uribe, José Darío (ed.), Historia del Banco de la República 1923-2015, chapter 6, pages 275-352, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdr:bdrcap:2017-10-275-352
    DOI: 10.32468/Ebook.664-366-5
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Juan Carlos Jaramillo & Armando Montenegro, 1982. "Cuenta especial de cambios: Descripción y análisis de su evolución reciente," Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República, vol. 1(2), pages 109-186, September.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    3. repec:fth:harver:1496 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bancos centrales; Política monetaria; Bancos; Derecho constitucional; Colombia; Central banks; Monetary policy; Banks; Constitutional law; Colombia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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