Francisco Silva
Personal Details
First Name: | Francisco |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Silva |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | psi931 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
http://sites.google.com/site/franciscosilva2909/ | |
Terminal Degree: | 2016 Department of Economics; University of Pennsylvania (from RePEc Genealogy) |
Affiliation
Department of Economics
Business School
Deakin University
Melbourne, Australiahttp://www.deakin.edu.au/business/economics
RePEc:edi:sedeaau (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Nicolás Figueroa & José-Alberto Guerra & Francisco Silva, 2022. "The role of information in collective decisions," Documentos CEDE 20508, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020.
"Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification,"
Documentos de Trabajo (working papers)
0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
- Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020. "Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation," Documentos de Trabajo 540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Francisco Silva & Samir Mamadehussene, 2020. "The Equivalence Between Sequential and Simultaneous Firm Decisions," Documentos de Trabajo 541, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Francisco Silva, 2016. "Euthanasia: The Fear of Becoming a Burden," Documentos de Trabajo 478, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Francisco Silva, 2016.
"Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit?,"
Documentos de Trabajo
477, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Francisco Silva, 2020. "Should the government provide public goods if it cannot commit?," Documentos de Trabajo 538, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
Articles
- Silva, Francisco, 2024. "Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
- Samir Mamadehussene & Francisco Silva, 2023. "Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 192-211, March.
- Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023.
"Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
- Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Francisco Silva, 2023. "Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 720-737, July.
- Silva, Francisco, 2022. "The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 379-388.
- Rodrigo Harrison & Francisco Silva, 2020. "A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Voluntary Euthanasia And Physician Assisted Suicide," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(2), pages 745-763, April.
- Francisco Silva, 2020. "The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 99-113, November.
- Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
- Francisco Silva, 2019. "If We Confess Our Sins," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1389-1412, August.
- Francisco Silva, 2017. "Inducing Overconfidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 451-460, January.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020.
"Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification,"
Documentos de Trabajo (working papers)
0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
Cited by:
- Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubinski, 2023. "Selecting a Winner with External Referees," Working Papers 99, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
- Christoph Carnehl & Marco Ottaviani & Justus Preusser, 2024. "Designing Scientific Grants," Papers 2410.12356, arXiv.org.
- Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023. "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
- Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020.
"Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation,"
Documentos de Trabajo
540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
Cited by:
- Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023. "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
Articles
- Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023.
"Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Francisco Silva, 2020.
"The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 99-113, November.
Cited by:
- Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020.
"Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification,"
Documentos de Trabajo (working papers)
0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
- Silva, Francisco, 2024. "Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(3), July.
- Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
- Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020.
"Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification,"
Documentos de Trabajo (working papers)
0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Silva, Francisco, 2019.
"Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
Cited by:
- Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020.
"Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification,"
Documentos de Trabajo (working papers)
0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
- Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020. "Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation," Documentos de Trabajo 540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Juan Pereyra & Francisco Silva, 2020.
"Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification,"
Documentos de Trabajo (working papers)
0420, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Francisco Silva, 2019.
"If We Confess Our Sins,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1389-1412, August.
Cited by:
- Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020. "Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation," Documentos de Trabajo 540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
More information
Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.Statistics
Access and download statistics for all items
Co-authorship network on CollEc
NEP Fields
NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2017-04-09 2021-07-12 2021-07-12 2021-07-12 2022-05-02. Author is listed
- NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2021-07-12 2022-05-02. Author is listed
- NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2022-11-28
- NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2021-07-12
- NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2022-11-28
- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2021-07-12
Corrections
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