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If We Confess Our Sins

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  • Francisco Silva

Abstract

I consider a scenario where a social planner suspects that a crime has been committed. There are many suspects and at most one of them is guilty. I characterize the optimal mechanism for the social planner under different assumptions with respect to her commitment power. I find that the optimal mechanism is a “confession inducing mechanism”: Before an investigation, each agent can confess to being guilty in exchange for a reduced punishment. I find that these mechanisms do better than the traditional trial mechanism because of information externalities: When an agent credibly confesses his guilt, he reveals everyone else's innocence.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Silva, 2019. "If We Confess Our Sins," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1389-1412, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:60:y:2019:i:3:p:1389-1412
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12390
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    Cited by:

    1. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
    2. Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    3. Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020. "Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation," Documentos de Trabajo 540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

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