Ryuji Sano
Personal Details
First Name: | Ryuji |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Sano |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | psa1060 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
Affiliation
International Graduate School of Social Sciences
Yokohama National University
Yokohama, Japanhttp://www.igss.ynu.ac.jp/
RePEc:edi:gsyokjp (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Ryuji Sano, 2017. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Overbooking, Different Deadlines, and Multi-unit Demands," KIER Working Papers 963, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Ryuji Sano, 2016. "Iterative Revelation Mechanisms," KIER Working Papers 937, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Akitoshi Muramoto & Ryuji Sano, 2016.
"Sequential Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects,"
KIER Working Papers
945, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sano, Ryuji, 2016. "Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 49-51.
- Ryuji Sano, 2015. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Different Use Lengths," KIER Working Papers 924, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Ryuji Sano, 2015. "Improving Efficiency Using Reserve Prices: An Equilibrium Analysis of Core-Selecting Auctions," KIER Working Papers 926, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
Articles
- Ryuji Sano, 2018. "An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 101-122, December.
- Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sano, Ryuji, 2016.
"Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 49-51.
- Akitoshi Muramoto & Ryuji Sano, 2016. "Sequential Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects," KIER Working Papers 945, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Sano, Ryuji, 2013. "Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 112-117.
- Sano, Ryuji, 2012. "Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 637-650.
- Sano, Ryuji, 2011. "Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 602-606, June.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
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Sorry, no citations of working papers recorded.
Articles
- Sano, Ryuji, 2013.
"Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 112-117.
Cited by:
- Chen, Ning & Ghosh, Arpita & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2014.
"Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 367-391.
- Chen, Ning & Ghosh, Arpita & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2011. "Auctions for Social Lending: A Theoretical Analysis," Research Papers 2078, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Chen, Ning & Ghosh, Arpita & Lambert, Nicolas S., 2014.
"Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 367-391.
- Sano, Ryuji, 2012.
"Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 637-650.
Cited by:
- Kemal Guler & Martin Bichler & Ioannis Petrakis, 2016. "Ascending Combinatorial Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 609-639, May.
- Christian Kroemer & Martin Bichler & Andor Goetzendorff, 2016. "(Un)expected Bidder Behavior in Spectrum Auctions: About Inconsistent Bidding and Its Impact on Efficiency in the Combinatorial Clock Auction," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 31-63, January.
- Martin Bichler & Zhen Hao & Gediminas Adomavicius, 2017. "Coalition-Based Pricing in Ascending Combinatorial Auctions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 159-179, March.
- Bart Vangerven & Dries R. Goossens & Frits C. R. Spieksma, 2021. "Using Feedback to Mitigate Coordination and Threshold Problems in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 63(2), pages 113-127, April.
- Meng, Xin & Gunay, Hikmet, 2017.
"Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 165-187.
- Hikmet Gunay & Xin Meng, 2012. "Exposure Problem in Multi-unit Auctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0848, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- MENG, Xin & GUNAY, Hikmet, 2017. "Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-43, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
- Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Jürgen Wolf, 2013. "Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 511-545, December.
- Ryuji Sano, 2015. "Improving Efficiency Using Reserve Prices: An Equilibrium Analysis of Core-Selecting Auctions," KIER Working Papers 926, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Ryuji Sano, 2018. "An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 101-122, December.
- Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion & Steinberg, Richard, 2017.
"Competing Combinatorial Auctions,"
EconStor Preprints
171995, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Thomas Kittsteiner & Marion Ott & Richard Steinberg, 2022. "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1130-1137, December.
- Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion & Steinberg, Richard, 2021. "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Ahead of .
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Oleg Baranov, 2020. "Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 251-273, March.
- Sano, Ryuji, 2011.
"Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 602-606, June.
Cited by:
- Ryuji Sano, 2021. "Dynamic communication mechanism design," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 163-180, July.
- Ryuji Sano, 2016. "Iterative Revelation Mechanisms," KIER Working Papers 937, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Jürgen Wolf, 2013. "Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 511-545, December.
- Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektas, "undated".
"Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions,"
GSIA Working Papers
2012-E23, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektaş, 2015. "Core deviation minimizing auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 367-376, May.
- Ryuji Sano, 2015. "Improving Efficiency Using Reserve Prices: An Equilibrium Analysis of Core-Selecting Auctions," KIER Working Papers 926, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Ryuji Sano, 2018. "An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 101-122, December.
- Ott, Marion & Beck, Marissa, 2013. "Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79946, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Ott, Marion, 2019. "Simple Bayesian and Ex-Post Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203616, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
More information
Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.Statistics
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NEP Fields
NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2015-07-04 2015-08-30 2016-04-09 2016-08-07 2017-02-19. Author is listed
- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2016-04-09 2016-08-07
- NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2017-02-19
- NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (1) 2016-08-07
- NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2017-02-19
- NEP-GER: German Papers (1) 2015-08-30
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