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Igor Mouraviev

Personal Details

First Name:Igor
Middle Name:
Last Name:Mouraviev
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pmo911

Affiliation

Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung
Universität Bielefeld

Bielefeld, Germany
http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/
RePEc:edi:imbiede (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Mouraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2016. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 510, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  2. Mouraviev, Igor, 2014. "Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 494, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

Articles

  1. Mouraviev, Igor & Rey, Patrick, 2011. "Collusion and leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 705-717.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Mouraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2016. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 510, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

    Cited by:

    1. Jürgen Eichberger & Simon Grant & David Kelsey, 2017. "Ambiguity and the Centipede Game: Strategic Uncertainty in Multi-Stage Games," Discussion Papers 1705, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    2. Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014. "A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players," MPRA Paper 57336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Riedel, Frank, 2017. "Uncertain acts in games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 571, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    4. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 85-108.
    5. Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014. "Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, September.
    6. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Emiliano Catonini & Giacomo Lanzani & Massimo Marinacci, 2017. "Ambiguity Attitudes and Self-Confirming Equilibrium in Sequential Games," Working Papers 607, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    7. Stauber, Ronald, 2017. "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 409-432.
    8. Eran Hanany & Peter Klibanoff & Sujoy Mukerji, 2020. "Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 135-187, May.
    9. Muraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2017. "Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 26-41.
    10. Grant, Simon & Meneghel, Idione & Tourky, Rabee, 2016. "Savage games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    11. Gerrit Bauch, 2023. "Underreaction and dynamic inconsistency in communication games under noise," Papers 2311.12496, arXiv.org.
    12. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguous Communication," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264027, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

  2. Mouraviev, Igor, 2014. "Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 494, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

    Cited by:

    1. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03760756, HAL.
    2. Tim Reuter, 2013. "Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-09, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    3. David Spector, 2017. "Cheap talk, monitoring and collusion," Working Papers hal-01975642, HAL.
    4. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(2), pages 193-216, March.
    5. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2016. "Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2016-11, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    6. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Post-Print halshs-03760756, HAL.

Articles

  1. Mouraviev, Igor & Rey, Patrick, 2011. "Collusion and leadership," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 705-717.

    Cited by:

    1. Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics 16179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    2. Dijkstra, Pieter, 2015. "Price leadership and unequal market sharing," Research Report 15005-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    3. Boshoff, Willem & Frübing, Stefan & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2015. "Information exchange through non-binding advance price announcements: An antitrust analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-060, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    4. Aichele, Markus, 2013. "Abuse of forward contracts to semi-collude in volatile markets," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79755, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Thomas Bourveau & Guoman She & Alminas Žaldokas, 2020. "Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 295-332, May.
    6. Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick & Franck, Jens-Uwe, 2013. "Endogenous Price Commitment, Sticky and Leadership Pricing: Evidence from the Italian Petrol Market," Discussion Papers in Economics 16182, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    7. Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2012. "Ringleaders in larger numbers, asymmetric cartels," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2012-10, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    8. Escobar, Juan F. & Llanes, Gastón, 2018. "Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 408-443.
    9. Angela S. Bergantino & Claudia Capozza & Mauro Capurso, 2018. "Pricing strategies: who leads and who follows in the air and rail passenger markets in Italy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(46), pages 4937-4953, October.
    10. Harrington, Joseph E., 2017. "A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 140-158.
    11. von Auer, Ludwig & Pham, Tu Anh, 2020. "Optimal Destabilization of Cartels," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224521, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Porter, Robert H., 2020. "Mergers and coordinated effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    13. Marco Marini & Giorgio Rodano, 2012. "Sequential vs Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games," DIAG Technical Reports 2012-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    14. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2012. "A Theory of Tacit Collusion," Economics Working Paper Archive 588, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    15. Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, 2018. "Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 45(1 Year 20), pages 29-50, June.
    16. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul, 2017. "Choosing not to compete: Can firms maintain high prices by confusing consumers?," Post-Print hal-01845684, HAL.
    17. Stephen Davies & Peter L. Ormosi & Martin Graffenberger, 2014. "Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2014-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    18. Iwan Bos & Frederick Wandschneider, 2011. "Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Leniency Program," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2011-13, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    19. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2023. "Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 775-804, September.
    20. Ludwig von Auer & Tu Anh Pham, 2019. "Optimal Destabilization of Cartels," Research Papers in Economics 2019-07, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    21. John S. Heywood & Dongyang Li & Guangliang Ye, 2020. "Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? a delivered pricing model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 39-60, September.
    22. Bertsch Christoph & Calcagno Claudio & Le Quement Mark, 2015. "Systematic Bailout Guarantees and Tacit Coordination," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-36, January.
    23. Mansley, Ryan & Miller, Nathan H. & Sheu, Gloria & Weinberg, Matthew C., 2023. "A price leadership model for merger analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    24. Dijkstra, Peter T., 2015. "Price leadership and unequal market sharing: Collusion in experimental markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 80-97.
    25. Tveito, Andreas, 2019. "Coordination and price leadership in an unregulated environment," Working Papers in Economics 4/19, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    26. Stephen Davies & Peter Ormosi & Martin Graffenberger, 2015. "Mergers after cartels: How markets react to cartel breakdown," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    27. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2019. "Induced Price Leadership and (Counter-)Spying Rivals' Play under Incomplete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 7476, CESifo.
    28. Hattori, Keisuke, 2021. "Profit-Sharing vs Price-Fixing Collusion with Heterogeneous Firms," MPRA Paper 110800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    29. Möllers, Claudia, 2016. "Reputation and foreclosure with vertical integration: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 232, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    30. Gerlach, Heiko & Nguyen, Lan, 2021. "Price staggering in cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    31. Hattori, Keisuke & Yamada, Mai, 2023. "Closing the Psychological Distance: The Effect of Social Interactions on Team Performance," MPRA Paper 117042, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    32. Epivent, Andréa & Lambin, Xavier, 2024. "On algorithmic collusion and reward–punishment schemes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2014-01-17
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2014-01-17
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2014-01-17
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2014-06-28
  5. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2014-06-28
  6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2014-01-17
  7. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2014-01-17
  8. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2014-06-28
  9. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2014-06-28

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