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Yizhaq Minchuk

Personal Details

First Name:Yizhaq
Middle Name:
Last Name:Minchuk
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pmi671
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Shamoon College of Engineering

http://www.sce.ac.il/
Israel, Beer Sheva

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Sela, Aner & Minchuk, Yizhaq, 2014. "All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes," CEPR Discussion Papers 9908, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. Yizhaq Minchuk, 2014. "Aggressive Bidding of Weak Bidders in All-Pay Auction," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(3), pages 1665-1668.
  2. Arieh Gavious & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2014. "Ranking asymmetric auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 369-393, May.
  3. Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner, 2014. "All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 130-134.
  4. Yizhaq Minchuk, 2013. "Low and High Types of Bidders in Asymmetric Auctions with A General Utility Function," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1328-1332.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

    Sorry, no citations of working papers recorded.

Articles

  1. Arieh Gavious & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2014. "Ranking asymmetric auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 369-393, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Cohensius Gal & Segev Ella, 2018. "Sequential Bidding in Asymmetric First Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
    2. Bobkova, Nina, 2020. "Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    3. Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2011. "Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations," Working Papers - Economics wp2011_08.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    4. Muhammed Ceesay & Nicola Doni & Domenico Menicucci, 2024. "Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations," Working Papers - Economics wp2024_20.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    5. Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2015. "Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1510, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    6. Timothy P. Hubbard & Rene Kirkegaard & Harry J. Paarsch, 2011. "Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 207, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    7. Patrick Hummel & R. Preston McAfee & Sergei Vassilvitskii, 2016. "Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 1031-1052, November.
    8. Kirkegaard, René, 2014. "Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 60-69.
    9. Kyungmin Kim & Youngwoo Koh, 2019. "Efficiency and Revenue in Asymmetric Auctions," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 371-391.

  2. Yizhaq Minchuk, 2013. "Low and High Types of Bidders in Asymmetric Auctions with A General Utility Function," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1328-1332.

    Cited by:

    1. Yizhaq Minchuk, 2014. "Aggressive Bidding of Weak Bidders in All-Pay Auction," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(3), pages 1665-1668.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2014-06-02
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2014-06-02
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2014-06-02
  4. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (1) 2014-06-02

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