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Joseph C. McMurray

Personal Details

First Name:Joseph
Middle Name:C.
Last Name:McMurray
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pmc219
https://economics.byu.edu/directory/joseph-c-mcmurray

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Brigham Young University

Provo, Utah (United States)
http://econ.byu.edu/
RePEc:edi:debyuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Herrera, Helios & McMurray, Joseph C., 2018. "Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 13280, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Herrera, Helios & McMurray, Joseph C., 2016. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," CEPR Discussion Papers 11463, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Joseph McMurray, 2008. "Information and Voting: the Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses," Wallis Working Papers WP59, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    repec:qmw:qmwecw:wp798 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. McMurray, Joseph, 2022. "Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 150-161.
  2. Helios Herrera & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Joseph C McMurray, 2019. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(624), pages 3137-3153.
  3. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
  4. Joseph McMurray, 2017. "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-Value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 108-140, November.
  5. McMurray, Joseph, 2017. "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 199-223.
  6. Joseph McMurray, 2015. "The paradox of information and voter turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 13-23, October.
  7. Joseph C. McMurray, 2013. "Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(1), pages 277-312.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Herrera, Helios & McMurray, Joseph C., 2018. "Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 13280, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippos Louis & Orestis Troumpounis & Nikolaos Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2020. "Protest voting in the laboratory," Working Papers 288072952, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    2. Kemal Kıvanç Aköz & Alexei Zakharov, 2023. "Electoral turnout with divided opposition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 439-475, April.
    3. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 15311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2022. "Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 153-176.
    5. Bol, Damien & Matakos, Konstantinos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

  2. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Herrera, Helios & McMurray, Joseph C., 2016. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," CEPR Discussion Papers 11463, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Frédéric Malherbe, 2016. "Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory," NBER Working Papers 21943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Schlangenotto, Darius & Schnedler, Wendelin & Vadovic, Radovan, 2020. "Against All Odds: Tentative Steps Toward Efficient Information Sharing in Groups," IZA Discussion Papers 13547, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. McMurray, Joseph, 2017. "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 199-223.
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2022. "Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 153-176.

  3. Joseph McMurray, 2008. "Information and Voting: the Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses," Wallis Working Papers WP59, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.

    Cited by:

    1. Rebecca Morton & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2008. "Let the Experts Decide? Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees," Discussion Papers 08-25, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Helios Herrera & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Joseph C McMurray, 2019. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(624), pages 3137-3153.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Joseph McMurray, 2017. "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-Value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 108-140, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    2. Pietro Ortoleva & Erik Snowberg, 2013. "Overconfidence in Political Behavior," NBER Working Papers 19250, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Paulo Barelli & Sourav Bhattacharya & Lucas Siga, 2022. "Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2161-2185, September.
    4. Stone, Daniel, 2018. "Just a big misunderstanding? Bias and Bayesian affective polarization," SocArXiv 58sru, Center for Open Science.
    5. McMurray, Joseph, 2017. "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 199-223.
    6. McMurray, Joseph, 2022. "Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 150-161.

  4. McMurray, Joseph, 2017. "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 199-223.

    Cited by:

    1. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    2. Nobuhiro Mizuno & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2022. "Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(3), pages 443-477, July.
    3. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2022. "Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 86-95.
    4. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Ravindran, Dilip & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2023. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 665, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    5. Somdeep Chatterjee & Jai Kamal, 2021. "Voting for the underdog or jumping on the bandwagon? Evidence from India’s exit poll ban," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 431-453, September.
    6. Joseph McMurray, 2017. "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-Value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 108-140, November.
    7. Christos Mavridis & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, 2018. "Polling in a proportional representation system," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(2), pages 297-312, August.
    8. Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2017. "Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives," MPRA Paper 82753, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Grillo, Alberto, 2019. "Voter turnout and government's legitimate mandate," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 252-265.

  5. Joseph McMurray, 2015. "The paradox of information and voter turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 13-23, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    2. Poy, Samuele & Schüller, Simone, 2020. "Internet and voting in the social media era: Evidence from a local broadband policy," Munich Reprints in Economics 84757, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. McMurray, Joseph, 2017. "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 199-223.
    4. Joseph McMurray, 2017. "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-Value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 108-140, November.
    5. Shane Sanders & Joel Potter & Justin Ehrlich & Justin Perline & Christopher Boudreaux, 2021. "Informed voters and electoral outcomes: a natural experiment stemming from a fundamental information-technological shift," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(1), pages 257-277, October.
    6. Apolte, Thomas & Müller, Julia, 2022. "The persistence of political myths and ideologies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).

  6. Joseph C. McMurray, 2013. "Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(1), pages 277-312.

    Cited by:

    1. Castanheira, Micael & Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2012. "Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 9234, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Piolatto, Amedeo & Schuett, Florian, 2015. "Media competition and electoral politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 80-93.
    3. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    4. Laurent Bouto & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Fédéric Malherbe, 2014. "Get Rid of Unanimity: The Superiority of Majority Rule with Veto Power," Working Papers 722, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    5. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2024. "Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation," Working Papers halshs-03519689, HAL.
    6. Louis Kaplow & Scott Duke Kominers, 2020. "On the Representativeness of Voter Turnout," NBER Working Papers 26913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Mats Ekman, 2017. "Puzzling evidence on voter turnout," Rationality and Society, , vol. 29(4), pages 449-470, November.
    8. Revelli, Federico, 2013. "Tax Limits and Local Democracy," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201336, University of Turin.
    9. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Frédéric Malherbe, 2016. "Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory," NBER Working Papers 21943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Tajika, Tomoya, 2022. "Voting on tricky questions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 380-389.
    11. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Moumita Deb & Johannes Lohse & Rebecca McDonald, 2024. "The swing voter's curse revisited: Transparency's impact on committee voting," Discussion Papers 24-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    12. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "The Effect of Handicaps on Turnout for Large Electorates: An Application to Assessment Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 13921, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Kohei Daido & Tomoya Tajika, 2020. "Abstention by Loss-Averse Voters," Discussion Paper Series 205, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    14. Mengel, Friederike & Rivas, Javier, 2017. "Common value elections with private information and informative priors: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 190-221.
    15. Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 169-191.
    16. Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Heggedal, Tom-Reiel, 2019. "Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 146-168.
    17. Nurfatima Jandarova & Aldo Rustichini, 2024. "Political participation and party preferences," Working Papers 25, Finnish Centre of Excellence in Tax Systems Research.
    18. Paulo Barelli & Sourav Bhattacharya & Lucas Siga, 2022. "Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2161-2185, September.
    19. Sascha Kurz, 2018. "Importance In Systems With Interval Decisions," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 21(06n07), pages 1-23, September.
    20. Salvatore Nunnari & Eugenio Proto & Aldo Rustichini, 2024. "Cognitive Abilities and the Demand for Bad Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 11206, CESifo.
    21. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Deb, Moumita & Lohse, Johannes & McDonald, Rebecca, 2024. "The Swing Voter’s Curse Revisited: Transparency’s Impact on Committee Voting," Working Papers 0744, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    22. McMurray, Joseph, 2017. "Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 199-223.
    23. Joseph McMurray, 2017. "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-Value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 108-140, November.
    24. Cristina Gualdani & Shruti Sinha, 2023. "Identification in Discrete Choice Models with Imperfect Information," Working Papers 949, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    25. Joseph Campbell & Alessandra Casella & Lucas de Lara & Victoria R. Mooers & Dilip Ravindran, 2022. "Liquid Democracy. Two Experiments on Delegation in Voting," NBER Working Papers 30794, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    26. Kirill S. Evdokimov, 2024. "Monopoly agenda control with privately informed voters," Papers 2402.06495, arXiv.org.
    27. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Size and Efficient Rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 15311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    28. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2022. "Appointed learning for the common good: Optimal committee size and monetary transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 153-176.
    29. Tajika, Tomoya, 2018. "Collective Mistakes: Intuition Aggregation for a Trick Question under Strategic Voting," Discussion Paper Series 674, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    30. Faravelli, Marco & Man, Priscilla & Walsh, Randall, 2015. "Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 1-23.
    31. Jun Chen, 2021. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem with Information Acquisition," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-33, October.
    32. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2012. "Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2083-2123.
    33. Jinhee Jo, 2023. "Informational roles of pre‐election polls," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 441-458, June.
    34. Hughes, Niall, 2020. "Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections," MPRA Paper 100363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    35. Joseph McMurray, 2015. "The paradox of information and voter turnout," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 13-23, October.
    36. McMurray, Joseph, 2022. "Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 150-161.
    37. Aldo Rustichini, 2023. "Economics with a biological foundation," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 1-40, June.
    38. Alexander Lundberg, 2020. "The importance of expertise in group decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 495-521, October.
    39. Helios Herrera & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Joseph C. McMurray, 2016. "The Marginal Voter's Curse," Working Papers 798, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    40. Apolte, Thomas & Müller, Julia, 2022. "The persistence of political myths and ideologies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    41. Hans Gersbach, 2022. "New Forms of Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 10134, CESifo.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (4) 2009-01-24 2016-07-09 2016-09-04 2018-11-12
  2. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (4) 2009-01-24 2016-07-09 2016-09-04 2018-11-12
  3. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (3) 2016-07-09 2016-09-04 2018-11-12
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2016-07-09 2018-11-12
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2009-01-24
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2016-09-04

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