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Aidas Masiliūnas
(Aidas Masiliunas)

Personal Details

First Name:Aidas
Middle Name:
Last Name:Masiliunas
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pma2601
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://masiliunas.github.io/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Sheffield

Sheffield, United Kingdom
http://www.shef.ac.uk/economics/
RePEc:edi:desheuk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aidas Masiliunas, 2021. "Market Concentration and Incentives to Collude in Cournot Oligopoly Experiments," ISER Discussion Paper 1131, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  2. Aidas Masiliūnas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Post-Print hal-01681048, HAL.
  3. Aidas Masiliunas, 2016. "Inefficient Lock-in with Sophisticated and Myopic Players," Working Papers halshs-01304178, HAL.
  4. Masiliunas, Aidas & Mengel, Friederike & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2014. "Behavioral variation in Tullock contests," Working Paper Series in Economics 55, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.

Articles

  1. Masiliūnas, Aidas & Nax, Heinrich H., 2020. "Framing and repeated competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 604-619.
  2. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2019. "Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-12.
  3. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 214-251.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aidas Masiliunas, 2021. "Market Concentration and Incentives to Collude in Cournot Oligopoly Experiments," ISER Discussion Paper 1131, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

    Cited by:

    1. Bulutay, Muhammed & Hales, David & Julius, Patrick & Tasch, Weiwei, 2021. "Imperfect tacit collusion and asymmetric price transmission," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 192(C), pages 584-599.

  2. Aidas Masiliūnas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Post-Print hal-01681048, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Jan Libich & Dat Thanh Nguyen & Hubert Janos Kiss, 2023. "Running Out of Bank Runs," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 1-39, August.
    2. Xiao Han & Yun Yu & Bin Jia & Zi‐You Gao & Rui Jiang & H. Michael Zhang, 2021. "Coordination Behavior in Mode Choice: Laboratory Study of Equilibrium Transformation and Selection," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(10), pages 3635-3656, October.
    3. David Danz & Lise Vesterlund & Alistair J. Wilson, 2020. "Belief Elicitation: Limiting Truth Telling with Information on Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8048, CESifo.
    4. Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia, 2018. "Who runs first to the bank?," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1826, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    5. Hubert J. Kiss & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia, 2020. "Who withdraws first? Line formation during bank runs," ThE Papers 20/02, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    6. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2019. "Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-12.
    7. Michal Krol & Magdalena Ewa Krol, 2020. "On the strategic value of ‘shooting yourself in the foot’: an experimental study of burning money," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 23-45, March.

  3. Aidas Masiliunas, 2016. "Inefficient Lock-in with Sophisticated and Myopic Players," Working Papers halshs-01304178, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Aidas Masiliunas, 2016. "Overcoming Coordination Failure in a Critical Mass Game: Strategic Motives and Action Disclosure," AMSE Working Papers 1609, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.

  4. Masiliunas, Aidas & Mengel, Friederike & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2014. "Behavioral variation in Tullock contests," Working Paper Series in Economics 55, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Zhuoqiong & Ong, David & Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "The Gender Difference in the Value of Winning," MPRA Paper 67098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    3. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2019. "Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1001-1031, December.
    4. Cason, Timothy N. & Masters, William A. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2020. "Winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: Theory and experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 314-327.
    5. Alcocer, Christian Diego & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Shupp, Robert, 2020. "Naive and sophisticated mixing: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 157-173.
    6. Kenan Huremovic, 2015. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," AMSE Working Papers 1521, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Feb 2015.
    7. John Morgan & Henrik Orzen & Martin Sefton & Dana Sisak, 2016. "Strategic and Natural Risk in Entrepreneurship: An Experimental Study," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 420-454, April.
    8. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anwesha Mukherjee & Theodore L. Turocy, 2016. "That's the ticket: Explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-07, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    9. Masiliūnas, Aidas & Nax, Heinrich H., 2020. "Framing and repeated competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 604-619.
    10. Bettina Rockenbach & Sebastian Schneiders & Marcin Waligora, 2018. "Pushing the bad away: reverse Tullock contests," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(1), pages 73-85, July.
    11. Lian Jian & Zheng Li & Tracy Xiao Liu, 2017. "Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 648-669, September.
    12. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2023. "Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 50-72.

Articles

  1. Masiliūnas, Aidas & Nax, Heinrich H., 2020. "Framing and repeated competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 604-619.

    Cited by:

    1. Jiménez-Jiménez, Francisca & Rodero-Cosano, Javier, 2023. "Conditioning competitive behaviour in experimental Bertrand markets through contextual frames," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    2. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aidas Masiliunas, 2021. "Market Concentration and Incentives to Collude in Cournot Oligopoly Experiments," ISER Discussion Paper 1131, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

  2. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 214-251.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (5) 2016-02-29 2016-03-17 2016-05-08 2016-10-23 2021-04-26. Author is listed
  2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2016-02-29 2021-04-26
  3. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (2) 2016-05-08 2016-10-23
  4. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (2) 2016-02-29 2016-03-17
  5. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2016-03-17
  6. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2021-04-26
  7. NEP-ENT: Entrepreneurship (1) 2014-02-15
  8. NEP-GRO: Economic Growth (1) 2014-02-15
  9. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2021-04-26
  10. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2016-05-08
  11. NEP-PKE: Post Keynesian Economics (1) 2016-05-08
  12. NEP-SOG: Sociology of Economics (1) 2014-02-15

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