Anat Lerner
Personal Details
First Name: | Anat |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Lerner |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | ple202 |
| |
https://www.openu.ac.il/en/personalsites/AnatLerner.aspx | |
Affiliation
The open University of Israel, Mathematics and Computer Science Department
https://www.openu.ac.il/en/pages/default.aspxIsrael, Ra'anana
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997.
"Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods,"
Game Theory and Information
9707010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Apr 1998.
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 2001. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525, October.
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 2001. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1596, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997. "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Articles
- Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2016. "Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(03), pages 1-10, September.
- Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2015. "Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 17(04), pages 1-25.
- Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2014. "Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(2), pages 1-19, April.
- Rica Gonen & Anat Lerner, 2014. "Two-Outcome dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 810-818.
- Lerner Anat & Gonen Rica, 2013. "Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 363-380, June.
- Rica Gonen & Anat Lerner, 2013. "The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(4), pages 1-21, November.
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 2001.
"Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525, October.
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information 9707010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Apr 1998.
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 2001. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1596, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Lerner, Anat, 1998. "A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 316-330, February.
Citations
Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.Working papers
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997.
"Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods,"
Game Theory and Information
9707010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Apr 1998.
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 2001. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525, October.
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 2001. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1596, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Cited by:
- Barbieri Stefano & Malueg David A., 2010. "Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Liu, Pengfei & Swallow, Stephen K. & Anderson, Christopher M., 2013.
"Threshold Level Public Goods Provision with Multiple Units: Experimental Effects of Disaggregated Groups with Rebates,"
Working Paper series
169756, University of Connecticut, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
- Pengfei Liu & Stephen K. Swallow & Christopher M. Anderson, 2016. "Threshold-Level Public Goods Provision with Multiple Units: Experimental Effects of Disaggregated Groups with Rebates," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 92(3), pages 515-533.
- Liu, Pengfei & Swallow, Stephen K. & Anderson, Christopher M., 2013. "Threshold Level Public Goods Provision with Multiple Units: Experimental Effects of Disaggregated Groups with Rebates," Working Papers 24, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
- Ellman, Matthew & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2019.
"Optimal crowdfunding design,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
- Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2016. "Optimal Crowdfunding Design," Working Papers 871, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2014. "Optimal Crowdfunding Design," Working Papers 14-21, NET Institute.
- Martimort, David, 2019.
""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2020. "“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02875061, HAL.
- Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2020. "“When Olson Meets Dahl”: From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy Making," Post-Print halshs-02875061, HAL.
- Zhi Li & Christopher Anderson & Stephen K. Swallow, 2012. "Uniform Price Mechanisms for Threshold Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 14, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
- Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2008. "Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous‐Strategy Equilibria in the Private‐Information Subscription Game," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(4), pages 529-545, August.
- Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A., 2010.
"Threshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 848-861, December.
- Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2009. "Threshold Uncertainty in the Private-Information Subscription Game," Working Papers 0903, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Stefano Barbieri, 2023. "Complementarity and information in collective action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 167-206, January.
- Zhi Li & Dongsheng Chen & Pengfei Liu, 2023. "Assurance payments on the coordination of threshold public goods provision: An experimental investigation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(2), pages 407-436, April.
- Jehiel, Philippe & moldovanu, benny, 2006.
"Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Jingfeng Lu & Euston Quah, 2009. "Private Provisions of a Discrete Public Good with Voluntary Participation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 343-362, June.
- Li, Zhi & Anderson, Christopher M. & Swallow, Stephen K., 2016. "Uniform price mechanisms for threshold public goods provision with complete information: An experimental investigation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 14-26.
- Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2008. "Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(1), pages 51-80, October.
- Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2010.
"Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice,"
Working Papers
1006, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2014. "Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 372-400, June.
- Zhi Li & Pengfei Liu & Stephen K. Swallow, 2021. "Assurance Contracts to Support Multi-Unit Threshold Public Goods in Environmental Markets," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 80(2), pages 339-378, October.
- Li, Zhi & Anderson, Christopher M. & Swallow, Stephen, 2012. "Uniform Price Mechanisms for Threshold Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper series 148349, University of Connecticut, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
- An, Yonghong & Hu, Yingyao & Liu, Pengfei, 2018. "Estimating heterogeneous contributing strategies in threshold public goods provision: A structural analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 124-146.
- Toth, Sandor F. & Rabotyagov, Sergey S. & Ettl, Gregory J., 2009. "Experimental Testbeds for ECOSEL: A Market Framework for Private Provision of Forest Ecosystem Services," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49565, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Murat Yilmaz, 2010. "Auctioning a Discrete Public Good under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010/14, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
- Peyman Khezr & Flavio M. Menezes, 2019. "Funding natural monopoly infrastructure expansion: auctions versus regulated uniform access prices," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 193-213, April.
Articles
- Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2015.
"Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 17(04), pages 1-25.
Cited by:
- Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2016. "Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(03), pages 1-10, September.
- Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2014.
"Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 5(2), pages 1-19, April.
Cited by:
- Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2016. "Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(03), pages 1-10, September.
- Lerner Anat & Gonen Rica, 2013.
"Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 363-380, June.
Cited by:
- Rica Gonen & Anat Lerner, 2013. "The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(4), pages 1-21, November.
- Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2014. "Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(2), pages 1-19, April.
- Rica Gonen & Anat Lerner, 2013.
"The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 4(4), pages 1-21, November.
Cited by:
- Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2014. "Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities," Games, MDPI, vol. 5(2), pages 1-19, April.
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 2001.
"Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525, October.
See citations under working paper version above.
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information 9707010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Apr 1998.
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 2001. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1596, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Lerner, Anat, 1998.
"A Pie Allocation Among Sharing Groups,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 316-330, February.
Cited by:
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997.
"Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods,"
Game Theory and Information
9707010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Apr 1998.
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 2001. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 501-525, October.
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 2001. "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1596, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Calleja, P. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2001.
"Multi-Issue Allocation Games,"
Discussion Paper
2001-30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Calleja, P. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P., 2001. "Multi-Issue Allocation Games," Other publications TiSEM db0ee5ec-5e97-4b1a-9e01-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997. "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Calleja, Pedro & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud, 2005. "Multi-issue allocation situations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 164(3), pages 730-747, August.
- Rhee, Sangkyu, 2006. "Allocation problems among sharing groups," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 398-418, February.
- Rhee, Sangkyu, 2005. "Sharing-group allocation problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 51-56, January.
- Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997.
"Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods,"
Game Theory and Information
9707010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Apr 1998.
More information
Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.Statistics
Access and download statistics for all items
Co-authorship network on CollEc
NEP Fields
NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 1998-10-02
- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 1998-10-02
- NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 1998-10-02
- NEP-PUB: Public Finance (1) 1998-10-02
Corrections
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